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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
USING PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES TO UNDERSTAND CITIZEN ATTITUDES 
TOWARD GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND COLLABORATIVE 
BEHAVIORS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
There have been various approaches to studying the effectiveness of government 
performance in public administration. While some have focused on broad organizational 
factors, others have taken an individual level approach by applying concepts and methods 
from psychology and behavioral economics. This three-essay dissertation continues this 
latter approach by examining the role of cognitive mechanisms in explaining citizen 
attitudes toward government performance as well as collaborative behaviors in the public 
sector.  
The first essay explored the role of detailed versus abstract mental construals in 
understanding the relationship between expectations of public service performance and 
attitudes toward a government. Type of thinking, when it fit well with the information 
about either how or why public services were provided, was predicted to produce more 
positive attitudes toward government than in the absence of fit. However, these 
predictions were not confirmed.  
The second essay induced either an abstract or a detailed mode thinking in 
participants. Because abstract thinkers are more likely to focus on the desirability of 
outcomes, and detailed thinkers are more likely to focus on the feasibility of outcomes, it 
was predicted that abstract thinking, compared to detailed thinking, would create higher 
expectations of public services and lower perceived government performance. The 
findings were inconclusive.  
     The final essay, combining prospect theory and expectancy-disconfirmation concepts, 
proposed a new model testing the relationship between citizen attitudes and collaborative 
behavior. Using a cross-sectional data set of US citizens, the results revealed a predicted 
non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction with government performance and co-
production. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 Many scholars have used concepts from psychology and behavioral economics to 
study public administration. The topics examined include leadership and public service 
motivation (Bellé, 2014, 2015), transparency of and trust in government organizations 
(Grimmelikhuijsen  & Meijer, 2014; Peisakhin & Pinto, 2010), the role of information 
related to government performance (James, 2011a, 2011b), and citizen attitudes toward 
governments (Olsen, 2015; Petrovsky, Mok, & Leon-Cazares, 2017; Van Ryzin, 2013). 
Also, these studies have applied psychological methods, such as experimental 
manipulations and psychometrics, (Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2016; James, 2011b; James 
& Moseley, 2014; Olsen, 2015; Perry 1996; Tummers, 2012). In general, these studies 
suggest that the effectiveness of government performance and public services can be 
improved by understanding how and why citizens and government officials behave, make 
decisions, and collaborate in the public sector (Grimmelikhuijsen, Jilker, Olsen, & 
Tummers, 2017; Olsen, 2015; Tummers, Olsen, Jilke, & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016). 
This dissertation contributes to this growing body of research in behavioral public 
administration by further applying psychological theories and experimental methods to 
the study of citizen satisfaction with government performance and behaviors of 
coproduction. Although research has examined the connection between citizen 
expectations and satisfaction with public services (James, 2011b; Petrovsky et al., 2016; 
Van Ryzin, 2004, 2006, 2013), there has been little focus on the cognitive mechanisms 
that explain such a relationship. Also, although additional research has examined the 
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relationship between citizen satisfaction and citizen participation in the provision of 
public services (Bovaird, Van Ryzin, Löffler, & Parrado, 2015; Parrado, Van Ryzin, 
Bovaird, & Löffler, 2013), there are few studies incorporating the cognitive mechanisms 
that might underlie this connection as well. This dissertation is composed of three 
independent essays that incorporated theories from psychology and behavioral economics 
to begin to explore possible cognitive mechanisms in each case.  
The first essay, described in Chapter 2, is guided by construal level theory (Trope 
& Liberman, 2003) and examines the role of detailed versus abstract mental construals 
(e.g., thinking about “the trees” or “the forest”) in influencing the relationship between 
expectations of public service performance and attitudes toward government. It is 
predicted that individuals expecting what government should perform (normative 
expectations) would think in abstract-terms, while individuals expecting what 
government will perform (empirical expectations) would think in concrete-terms. Also, 
people will differently understand the information about why a government provides 
public services versus how a government provides public services as a function of these 
two types of thinking processes. It is predicted that when the type of thinking fits well 
with the information content then more positive attitudes result. In other words, 
normative expectation and why information align with abstract thinking, while empirical 
expectation and how information align with detailed thinking.   
The goal of the second essay, described in Chapter 3, is to evaluate how abstract 
and detailed ways of thinking would affect individuals’ perception and judgment of 
government performance. People with distinct ways of thinking might consider different 
aspects of public services while evaluating public services. Thus, depending on the 
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treatments priming individuals to hold different ways of thinking, different relational 
patterns among expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction were expected. 
This research primes participants to think either in abstract or detailed terms and tested 
the effects of expectations and perceived performance of public services on satisfaction 
with the services between the two groups. 
The final essay in Chapter 4 examines the relationship between citizen 
satisfaction with government performance and citizen participation in the provision of 
public services (i.e., co-production). Guided by the prospect theory framework and the 
expectancy-disconfirmation model, it tests the nonlinear relationship between co-
production and satisfaction by using US citizen data. 
Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses the findings, contributions of the 
dissertation, limitations, and outlines future studies. 
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Chapter 2 
The Distinctive Roles of Different Types of Expectations and Information about 
Government Performance on Forming Attitudes Toward Governments: The 
Differences between Abstract and Concrete Thought Processes 
 
Governments stress the importance of evaluating their performance since the 
evaluation is closely related to the efficiency of government performance and 
accountability. However, measuring the performance and outcomes of public services is 
challenging. Among various approaches for evaluating government performance, one 
approach is to assess citizen attitudes toward government performance. Many scholars in 
public administration have stressed the importance of citizen expectations of government 
performance since those expectations are related to citizen attitudes (e.g., satisfaction 
with government performance and trust in governments) and citizen behaviors (e.g., 
choice of services and voting behavior). Some studies have divided expectations into 
various categories, including normative and empirical expectations, and evaluated the 
relationships between expectations of public services and citizen attitudes toward 
government performance. However, there are limited studies on what mental mechanisms 
citizens use to understand government performance and form attitudes toward those 
governments. 
Acknowledging the complexity of citizen expectations about government 
performance1, this essay tests the roles of normative and empirical expectations, as well 
                                                 
1 To design a simple and clear experiment, this essay categorized expectations into normative and empirical 
expectations. However, in the real world, individuals could hold both normative and empirical expectations 
at the same time. Also, different other than the normative and empirical expectations could play role in 
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as information about public services delivered by governments, when people form 
attitudes toward such governments. Psychological mechanisms are treated as latent 
variables of expectations. Construal level theory, whether citizens think in abstract or 
concrete ways (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007), is applied 
to evaluate the role of mental mechanisms in individuals’ interpretation of the 
information about government performance and the formation of attitudes toward 
governments. This essay tests whether participants holding different types of expectations 
distinctively understand information about government performance and form attitudes 
toward governments based on distinct thought processes. This essay is one of the first to 
extend the studies about citizen expectations of government performance by evaluating 
what mental mechanisms citizens use when they understand government performance 
and form attitudes toward governments. 
The following section reviews the theories of expectation formation and related 
studies. Then, after introducing the construal level theory, the theoretical argument 
connecting normative and empirical expectations with construal levels follows. The 
method section describes an experimental design to test the relationships among 
expectations, thinking processes, information about public services provided by 
governments, and attitudes toward governments. Finally, results are presented, which is 
followed by discussion and conclusion of the findings. 
The Role of Citizens’ Expectations 
 Studies of citizen attitudes toward government performance, especially citizen 
satisfaction with government performance, have stressed the importance of understanding 
                                                 
citizen attitude formation toward government performance. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper 
and save it for future studies. 
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the role of expectations (Hjortskov, 2018; James, 2009, 2011a; Poister & Thomas, 2011; 
Van Ryzin, 2004). The general concept of an expectation is a personal “anticipation of 
future consequences based on prior experiences, current circumstances, or other sources 
of information” (Oliver, 2010b, p. 313). In studies of citizen satisfaction, citizen 
expectations of government performance were considered as a reference point to compare 
with the perceived performance of public services and to judge the service qualities. 
Among numerous definitions and measurements of expectations varying across scholars 
(Teas, 1993a, 1993b), many studies have focused on normative and empirical 
expectations of government performance in public administration (Jacobsen, Snyder, & 
Saultz, 2015; James, 2011a; Poister & Thomas, 2011). Normative expectations of 
government performance are individuals’ predictions of what should happen in a certain 
situation, whereas empirical expectations of government performance are peoples’ 
anticipations of what will occur in a particular situation (James, 2009). 
Citizens’ expectations can have both a normative and an empirical element. For 
example, they can reflect an ideal state of the quality a service should have, as well as 
consider an empirical prediction of the public service quality. This essay recognizes that 
normative and empirical expectations are not clear-cut in the real world. In fact, many 
citizens hold both normative and empirical expectations, mixed in many cases, for a 
variety of services and agencies. The idea is that one of the two components will tend to 
dominate in shaping the performance expectations a citizen holds for a particular service 
or agency. 
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Normative Expectations 
Normative expectations imply the reasonableness and desirability of public 
services, which reflect individuals’ ideas of what is right or wrong in an ideal world or a 
particular situation. When people form normative expectations of public services, they 
tend to think about the end-state of public services regarding what is tolerable, what is 
necessary, and what is desirable. However, whether the expected end-state of the services 
occurs or not is less important when individuals hold normative expectations. 
Some scholars have measured normative expectations by asking how services 
should be provided. In the private sector, Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry (1988) 
developed SERVQUAL, which measured consumers’ normative expectations by 
instructing people to imagine what an ‘excellent company’ might be. The authors 
questioned people about what the company should do, asking them to identify the 
desirable features of services in certain contexts. There is also a small number of studies 
in public management that measured and evaluated citizen normative expectations 
(Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; James, 2011b; Poister & Thomas, 2011). In the field of 
public administration, participants were asked how frequently the performance of their 
local government should be ‘excellent’ under the context of tax payments, available 
resources, and service delivery situations (James, 2009, 2011a). Participants' answers 
were recorded in five-point Likert scales, ranging from ‘should be excellent all the time’ 
to ‘should never be excellent.’ 
Empirical Expectations 
 Empirical expectations were defined with diverse terminologies, such as positive 
expectations (James, 2011a) and predictive expectations (Barbeau, 1985; Park, 2006). 
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Although scholars have used different terms, all terms hold a consistent notion: a 
prediction of what will happen in the future. Unlike normative expectations, the 
reasonableness, necessity, and desirableness of public services are considered less when 
people shape empirical expectations (James, 2011a). Instead, individuals consider what is 
likely to occur based on partial information of a situation and their prior experiences 
related to services. In other words, empirical expectations are based on individuals’ 
prediction of the likelihood of future occurrences. For instance, people may expect that 
public services provided by their local government will decrease or be limited because of 
economic deprivation. Thus, people with empirical expectations examine conditions and 
situations that seem to influence the performance of services. 
 Empirical expectations were measured by asking people to predict how the 
quality of public services will be in the future. Van Ryzin (2004, 2006) measured 
empirical expectations of participants by asking the level of public service quality they 
expected to encounter. More specifically, participants were instructed to remember 
several years back and to rate their retrospective expectations of the current overall 
quality of public services provided by New York City government. On the other hand, 
James (2011a) measured empirical expectations by questioning how frequently they 
thought they would experience excellent quality of public services. 
 Since each type of expectation reflects distinct dimensions, each of them plays a 
unique role in evaluating performance and experience with services. In addition, 
normative and empirical expectations seem to have different relationships with 
satisfaction. Empirically, normative expectations have consistently displayed a negative 
direct relationship with satisfaction (James, 2009; Poister & Thomas, 2011), whereas 
 9 
 
 
empirical expectations have tended to have a positive direct relationship with satisfaction 
(Morgeson, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2004).  
 Furthermore, several studies have suggested that consumers’ expectations of 
public services could be managed. Expectations are not fixed; rather, they are flexible. 
Diverse factors, including personal past experiences of services, information about 
services from third parties, and word-of-mouth, influence consumers’ expectations about 
services (Cardozo, 1965; Oliver, 2010b). James (2011a) experimentally tested the effect 
of information about previous government performance on people’s expectations of 
future government performance. In sum, the research implies that expectations can be 
managed by providing appropriate information. 
 Although scholars agree that information about government performance plays an 
important role in developing citizen expectations and forming attitudes toward 
governments, there are various approaches about how information influences citizen 
expectations and attitudes toward government performance. Among many approaches to 
study the processes of expectation formation, the two main approaches are rational 
expectations and adaptive expectations. Rational expectation theory proposes that people 
form expectations based on the Bayesian learning process, constantly updating their 
belief based on the accumulation of new information (Cyert & DeGroot, 1974; Muth, 
1961; Snowdon, Vane, & Wynarczyk, 1994). Since an agent holding rational 
expectations uses all available information, past frequencies and tendencies of events are 
critical when anticipating the future. On the other hand, the adaptive expectation 
hypothesis, unlike rational expectation, assumes that recent past experiences or trends 
have more influence on forming expectations than the information about the far past ones 
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(Nerlove, 1958). Adaptive expectations are updated, not only by available information, 
but also by the government performance that actually occurred and experiences of a 
person. Therefore, adaptive expectations show behavioral aspects that could be explained 
by psychological concepts such as vividness of recall (Oliver, 2010b) and heuristics 
(James, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 Furthermore, it seems that participants holding different types of expectations 
related to public services select and consume information about government performance 
in different ways. James (2011a) compared the effects of information on normative and 
empirical expectations of government performance. Generally, he found that information 
about high past performance increased participants’ expectations while information about 
low past performance decreased their expectations. Interestingly, the author further 
observed that the information about government performance had inconsistent effects on 
each type of expectation of public services. Normative expectations were only affected 
by the information about high government performance in the past, while empirical 
expectations were affected by information about both high and low previous government 
performance. The study implies the possible management of expectations by 
understanding how normative and empirical expectations related to public services 
corresponds to information about government performance. 
 Although existing studies have tested the relationships among expectations and 
satisfaction related to government performance, there are few studies of citizen 
expectations that examined individuals’ cognitive processes. There are limited 
explanations as to why normative expectations of public services were more resistant to 
the effects of information about poor previous government performance than empirical 
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expectations of public services. Yet, concepts or theories from psychology can offer 
insight to this question. For instance, ‘representativeness,’ one of the heuristics suggested 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1973), might play a role in predicting the future. 
Representativeness is a way people predict the future under uncertainty, based on the 
existing prototype individuals’ have held at a given time. In the case of James’ study 
(2011a), it is possible that the distinct relationships between information and expectation 
types related to government performance result from different prototypes individuals hold 
about the desirability and feasibility of public services. 
What were the cognitive mechanisms that created different relationships between 
expectations and information about government performance? This paper uses a 
psychological theory, construal level theory, to broaden our understanding of the role of 
expectation and information in shaping attitudes toward government performance. The 
following section introduces construal level theory, from psychology and consumer 
behavior literature, and it discusses possible implications for the relationship between 
citizen expectations and information about government performance. This is significant 
because the two types of expectations share similar features with the level of construal. 
 
Applying Psychology Theory: Construal Level Theory 
Many scholars have demonstrated that individuals use different psychological 
ways to understand information, including one's surroundings and others’ actions. For 
instance, citizens understand information about public service deliveries by governments 
in different ways. Among various ways to think about activities by governments, some 
people understand government performance-related information in abstract terms; others 
understand these in concrete terms. Individuals who think about government performance 
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in abstract terms consider why governments deliver public services, and those who think 
in concrete terms consider how governments deliver public services.  
Action identification theory, one of many approaches to studying how individuals 
construe activities, argues that cognitive hierarchy leads humans to understand an action 
in either concrete or abstract ways (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). A high-level-identity 
(abstract) defines an action related to a cause, a reason, a purpose, or a meaning of the 
action. On the other hand, a low-level-identity (concrete) explains the action related to 
detailed ways of operating the action. People with high-level identities, for instance, tend 
to understand “writing a paper” as “expressing thoughts or opinions.” Contrastingly, 
people with low-level identities are likely to perceive it as “filling a paper with words.” 
Based on many empirical studies demonstrating these distinctive ways of thinking 
about actions, Liberman and Trope (1998) included the action identification theory and 
further developed this into the construal level theory. Construal level theory explains that 
people think in abstract or concrete ways when they perceive things that are 
psychologically close or distant to oneself (Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010). For example, People with a higher construal 
level tend to consider the general picture, the forest. They think in abstract and simple 
ways. People in a state of a higher construal level think more about essential ideas of a 
subject or an event, but less about contexts a subject or an event is situated in. They tend 
to be more goal-oriented than others with a lower construal level. On the other hand, 
people holding a lower construal level are inclined to focus on trees, but less on the 
forest. People in a state of a lower construal level are less goal-oriented and consider 
contexts a subject is situated in when they make decisions. Moreover, studies have 
 13 
 
 
empirically demonstrated the close relationships between individuals’ tendency of action 
identification and their construal levels (Freitas, Langsam, Clark, & Moeller, 2008; 
Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Kim, Rao, & Lee, 2009). A higher 
construal level is connected with abstract information, primary goals, and response to the 
desirability of an event; a lower construal level is related with detailed information, 
secondary goals, and responding to the feasibility of an event (Liberman & Trope, 1998).  
 How might these concepts from psychology explain the distinctive effects of 
information about government performance on normative and empirical expectations of 
public services? The features of normative and empirical expectations seem to share 
those of construal levels, especially related to the concept of action identification. 
Normative expectations seem to be related to a high level of construal since they are 
about goals and ideals rather than existing performance information (James, 2011a). 
Normative expectations reflect the reasonableness, necessity, and desirability of public 
services, all of which fit the characteristics of a higher construal level because a higher 
construal level leads people to consider the goal relevance and desirability of events. 
Also, a higher construal could explain why normative expectations were insusceptible to 
information about prior poor government performance in James’ study (2011a). When 
forming normative expectations of public services, people may perceive information 
about poor performance as unnecessary information. Normative expectations help people 
think about the excellent quality of services in a certain context. Poor performance is 
valueless information when thinking images of reasonable and desirable public services. 
However, information about excellent performance might be considered relevant 
information when individuals form normative expectations of government performance. 
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On the other hand, empirical expectations seem to be related with a low level of 
construal, as they are formed based on information about prior government performance 
that actually occurred (James, 2011a), which is deeply rooted in context. Since empirical 
expectations focus on the specific occurrences of services and less on the desirability of 
such services, empirical expectations could be highly sensitive to information about 
government performance – especially information about situations and contexts in which 
public services are delivered. These characteristics of empirical expectations of public 
services fit with the features of a low level of construal because both focus details and 
contexts of a subject or an event. Thus, unlike normative expectations, empirical 
expectations are quite sensitive to the information about public service deliveries and 
government performance that citizens receive. 
Flowing from this discussion, the first hypothesis to be tested is: 
H1: People holding normative expectations of public services are likely to have 
a higher construal level than people holding empirical expectations of public 
services. 
Therefore, citizens with normative expectations of public services will start to 
consider the purpose and desirability of public services provided by governments, which 
may lead citizens into a higher construal state. Participants with empirical expectations of 
public services may be more aware of their past experience with government 
performance and the practical feasibilities of government services, which are the features 
of low construal level. It is not expected that people with normative expectations will 
always have higher construal levels than people with empirical expectations; however, 
the current essay anticipates an average tendency that a normative expectation will induce 
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a higher construal level compared to an empirical expectation. Furthermore, a series of 
research papers has illustrated that mental representations interact with the framework of 
information about a product or a person when forming attitudes toward the subject of the 
information, which is discussed in the following section in more detail. 
The Fit between Mental Mechanisms and Message Frameworks of Information 
As mentioned previously, the match between mental mechanisms and message 
frameworks, whether both are compatible or not, influences human performance in 
executing tasks (Bar-Anan, Trope, Liberman, & Algom, 2007) and individuals’ 
evaluation processes (Kim et al., 2009). In this essay, the matching condition between 
mental representations and message frameworks is when a person focuses on the 
desirability of public services and reads information about government performance 
written in abstract terms (e.g., why governments provide public services) because both 
are related to a higher construal level. Another matching condition is when an individual 
holding a mental representation about the feasibility of public services reads a message 
about government performance in detailed terms (e.g., how governments deliver public 
services) because both are related to a lower construal level. Mismatch conditions are 
when a person thinking about desirability of public services reads a message in detailed 
terms and when a person thinking about feasibility of public services reads a message in 
abstract terms. 
There are various consequences of either a match or mismatch of the levels. When 
people read information that matched with their construal level, they were inclined to 
perceive the information with more fluency and understand the information more easily, 
leading them to 'feel' right about one’s judgment or activities (Reber, Schwarz, & 
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Winkielman, 2004). Based on the fluency of information processing, participants were 
likely to attribute their feeling ‘right’ about their judgment to a higher quality of the 
activity, and therefore, likely to consume the information. However, when they 
encountered information that was inconsistent with their mental mechanisms, they 
recognized it as less influential and were likely to ignore the information (Petty & 
Wegener, 1998; Reber et al., 2004). Thus, people were likely to evaluate the messages 
that were consistent with their mental mechanisms as more persuasive than information 
that was inconsistent with their construal level (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
In this vein, Kim et al. (2009) argue that the fitness of information and mental 
mechanisms shape people’s political attitudes. For instance, in their first experiment, 
participants who were primed to have a higher construal level rated the candidate more 
favorably and evaluated the statement to be more effective when they read a short 
statement about the purposes and reasons for a hypothetical person to be a candidate 
compared to the other statement about how the candidate planned to run one’s office. 
This essay indicates that information about a candidate, and the way that it’s presented, 
influences people’s preferences and judgments of an object or a person. 
Based on the literature discussed above, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Participants in the matching condition will form more positive attitudes 
toward the governments compared to those in the mismatch condition. 
Here, the matching condition is when people holding normative expectations 
about public services read a message about why governments provide public services, and 
when people holding empirical expectations related to public services read a message 
about how governments provide public services. The mismatching condition is when 
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people holding normative expectations read a message about the feasibility of public 
services provided by governments, and when people holding empirical expectations read 
a message about the desirability of public services provided by governments. Figure 2-1. 
describes the logic of the first and the second hypothesis. This essay builds the second 
hypothesis on the assumption that the first hypothesis in this essay is valid2: people with 
normative expectations of government performance are likely to operate on a higher 
construal level while people with empirical expectations of government performance are 
inclined to think in a lower construal level. Furthermore, people in matched conditions 
will understand information more intuitively and easily compared to mismatched 
conditions. This intuitive understanding of the matching conditions may lead people to 
form positive attitudes toward governments in evaluating government performance. 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Illustration for the second hypothesis 
 
Experimental Design and Materials 
 In the current essay, a two-by-two between-group experimental design was 
conducted: different types of expectations of public services and different message 
orientations about government performance as Figure 2-2. illustrates. Since young 
students tended to have fewer interactions with governments, the study instructed 
                                                 
2 For convenience to build further assumptions, for rest of this paper I will assume that the first hypothesis 
is true from this point. 
Normative 
Expectations 
Empirical 
Expectations 
Higher Construal 
Levels 
Lower Construal 
Levels 
‘Why’ Message 
‘How’ Message 
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participants to think about their hometown local government to help them better engage 
with the experiment. The vignettes of message orientations illustrated why or how their 
hometown local government delivered public services. For more details of experiment 
materials, please see Table A A1 in Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Experimental design to test the relationship between expectations and 
construal levels 
Measure the sense of familiarity of public services (N = 161) 
: Management of traffic signal systems, sidewalks, and street cleanness 
Arm 1 (N = 41) 
Normative Expectations 
Why message 
Arm 2 (N = 34) 
Empirical Expectations 
Why message 
Arm 3 (N = 48) 
Normative Expectations 
How message 
Arm 4 (N = 40) 
Empirical Expectations 
How message 
Normative Expectations (N = 89) 
Measure construal level (N = 163) 
: Psychological distance 
Empirical Expectations (N = 74) 
Message (Higher construal condition) 
: Why governments provide public services 
Message (Lower construal condition) 
: How governments provide public services 
Socio-Demographic Control Variables (N = 151) 
Measure Attitudes toward Governments (N = 163) 
: Confidence, Emotional Valence, Important, and Trust 
Attention Check (N = 163) 
: 12 participants failed (3 participants failed in each Arm) 
Invite respondents and randomly assign (N = 166) 
: 2 participants declined to participate and 3 agreed to participate 
but did not continued the study 
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General procedure. After the consent and before the treatment, participants’ sense of 
familiarity with the public services was measured as a control variable. In the first stage 
of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either normative (Arms 1 and 
3) or empirical (Arms 2 and 4) expectation conditions. Since construal levels were 
considered as a result of primed normative or empirical expectations of public services, 
construal levels were measured after the first manipulation. Then, participants were 
randomly assigned to read a different type of messages, ‘why (Arms 1 and 2)’ or ‘how 
(Arms 3 and 4)’ their hometown local government provided urban public services. 
Finally, participants’ attitudes toward their hometown local government were measured. 
At the end of the experiment, participants provided their socio-democratic information, 
such as gender, age, race, and ideology. Also, individuals were requested to think of their 
state before taking this survey and asked about their perceived performance of and 
satisfaction with the performance of their hometown local government. 
Participants. Students who were taking Dr. Voss’s class of American Government in the 
fall semester of 2017 at the University of Kentucky were recruited. The participants were 
18 years old or older. Students participated as a class activity for credit (5% of their total 
class grade) from November 16th to 29th in 2017. The online survey experiment setting 
was done in Qualtrics, software that allows researchers to design their survey and to 
collect data online3. Participants accessed the online survey through their computer or 
mobile phone. Students received the credit either when they successfully finished the 
experiment or when they submitted the alternative task. Those who decided not to 
                                                 
3 For more information, visit http://www.qualtrics.com. 
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participate in the study were asked to read a short essay, published by Pew Research 
Center, and write a 250-500 words summary of the article to earn equivalent credit in the 
class. The material covered citizen attitudes toward governments. The length of the 
material to equal the time and effort of participating in the experiment. 
 To check whether participants were carefully paying attention to the study, a 
pseudo-question that instructed them to select only 3 appeared before collecting 
individuals’ socio-demographic information. Participants who successfully followed the 
instruction continued and finished the study. Those who failed to follow the instruction 
could not complete the survey. Participants who failed to complete the survey were 
informed that they were unable to complete the experiment and would have to do the 
alternative assignment to receive the class credit. 
Among 166 students who accessed to the online survey, three decided not to 
participate, three decided to participate but did not finish the survey, and 12 participants4 
could not finish the experiment because they failed to pass the attention check. Thus, the 
sample size was 151 students (75 females, 74 males; mean of age = 19.86, s.d.age = 4.57). 
Among the 151 participants, 118 participants (78.15%) identified themselves as white, 11 
participants (7.28%) as African-American, 11 participants (7.28%) as Asian, 2 
participants (1.32%) as Native American/American Indian/Alaska Native, 7 participants 
(4.64%) as Hispanic, and 2 participants (1.32%) declined to reveal their ethnicity. 
The sense of familiarity with public services. Before individuals were assigned to the 
first treatment, they were asked about their familiarity with urban services: traffic signal 
                                                 
4 There were three participants in each experimental Arm, total 12 participants, who failed to pass attention 
check and continue the study. Therefore, although their responses for expectations of public services 
provided by their hometown local government, construal levels, and attitudes toward their local 
government were collected, those were not included in the analyses. 
 21 
 
 
systems, street cleanness, and sidewalk management. Participants’ familiarity with traffic 
signal systems (M = 5.03, s.d. = 1.76), road conditions (M = 4.88, s.d. = 1.72), and 
sidewalk conditions (M = 4.00, s.d. = 1.78) ranged from 1, very unfamiliar, to 7, very 
familiar. Cronbach’s alpha for the three items measuring the sense of familiarity with 
traffic signal systems, street cleanness, and sidewalk management was 0.84. Thus, the 
average sense of familiarity (M = 4.66, s.d. = 1.54) was used in this essay. See Table 2-1 
for a descriptive summary of the statistics of the items. 
 
Table 2-1 Descriptive summary statistics of expectations, attitudes, and control variables 
Variables Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum 
Expectations (average) 3.94 0.63 2 5 
    Overall gov. performance 3.89 0.76 2 5 
    Traffic signal management 4.19 0.87 1 5 
    Street cleanness 3.81 0.82 2 5 
    Sidewalk management 3.87 0.81 1 5 
Construal levels (average) 4.12 1.17 1 7 
    Social: closeness 4.66 1.81 1 7 
    Probability: likeliness 3.80 1.37 1 7 
    Time: Soon 3.89 1.48 1 7 
Attitudes (average) 5.15 1.06 2.50 7.25 
    Confidence 5.59 1.41 1 8 
    Emotional valence 4.70 1.26 1 7 
    Importance 5.63 1.28 2 7 
    Trust 4.66 1.37 1 7 
Control variables 
    Age 19.86 4.57 18 67 
    Gender (% female) 0.62 1.10 0 9 
    Ideology 2.98 1.19 1 5 
    Perceived performance 4.04 0.89 2 6 
    Satisfaction 3.95 1.02 1 6 
Familiarity (average) 4.66 1.54 1 7 
    Traffic signal 5.03 1.76 1 7 
    Road condition 4.88 1.72 1 7 
    Sidewalk condition 4 1.78 1 7 
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The 1st treatment: Priming expectations. The current study used the same methods as 
James (2011a) to prime either normative or empirical expectations of public services. 
Participants in both the normative and empirical conditions were instructed to rate their 
expectations of public services provided by their hometown local government. In the 
normative condition, participants were instructed to rate their normative expectations of 
public services, the idea of how often their hometown local government should 
excellently perform (e.g., Should be excellent all the time; should be excellent most of the 
time; should be excellent some of the time; should rarely be excellent; should never be 
excellent). In the empirical condition, participants were instructed to rate their empirical 
expectations of public services, their anticipation of how often their hometown local 
government will excellently perform (e.g. Will be excellent all the time; will be excellent 
most of the time; will be excellent some of the time; will rarely be excellent; will never be 
excellent). 
 A total of four questions about expectations were asked concerning overall local 
government performance, traffic signal management, street cleanliness, and sidewalk 
management. The order of items was randomized to minimize bias from the question 
sequence (Van de Walle & Van Ryzin, 2011). Therefore, there were two sequences of 
randomization: first, showing whether the overall government performance or three 
specific public services was randomized; next, presenting the order of specific public 
services was randomized. 
 Cronbach’s alpha for the four items was 0.77, which indicates relatively high 
internal consistency across four questions. Thus, the averaged expectation of the four 
public services (M = 3.94, s.d. = 0.63) was used in this essay. A t-test was used to check 
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whether participants formed different levels of construal depending on the priming of 
normative or empirical expectations of public services. The participants who were primed 
with normative expectations had a significantly higher average expectation (M = 4.20, s.e. 
= 0.05) than the others who were primed with empirical expectations (M = 3.62, s.e. = 
0.08; t(149) = – 6.40, p-value < 0.0001). 
Measuring construal levels. This essay followed previous experiments that measured 
construal levels through psychological distance (Liberman, Trope, Macrae, & Sherman, 
2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). There has been extensive research that has empirically 
demonstrated how construal levels are closely related to psychological distance (Fiedler, 
2007; Freitas et al., 2008; Kim & John, 2008; Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; 
Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Mandel, 2003; Nan, 2007; Yaccov Trope & Nira 
Liberman, 2010). The studies have consistently illustrated that a higher construal level 
led people to think a subject is psychologically far from them; whereas, a lower construal 
level led individuals to feel a subject is psychologically near them. 
For this study, construal levels were measured in three dimensions of 
psychological distance: temporal, social, and probabilistic distance. For temporal 
distance, participants were asked to answer how soon the performance of their hometown 
local government would meet their expectations for public services. For social distance, 
participants were asked how closely connected they felt to their hometown local 
government. Finally, participants were instructed to answer how likely the performance 
of their hometown local government would meet their expectations. Compared to those 
who form a lower construal level, individuals who were primed to hold a higher construal 
level thought that their hometown local government would take a longer time and would 
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be less likely to meet their expectations. Also, participants with a higher construal level 
were psychologically less connected to their hometown local government than those 
holding a lower construal level. Cronbach’s alpha for the three items measuring construal 
levels was 0.615. The average construal level across the three items (M = 4.12, s.d. = 
1.17) was used in this essay. 
The 2nd treatment: Message orientations. Participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of two vignettes. Both vignettes described three urban public services provided by 
their local hometown government: management of traffic signal systems, street 
cleanliness, and sidewalk management. In the ‘why’ message, the essay described the 
desirability and purposes of providing the public services by their hometown local 
government; ‘why’ their hometown local government would manage the traffic signal 
systems, cleans streets, and manage sidewalks. In the ‘how’ message, the passage 
illustrated the methods and strategies their hometown local government would use to 
provide the public services; ‘how’ the local government would deliver the services. To 
emphasize the effects of the messages, the phrases in the title and bullet points that 
included ‘why’ or ‘how’ in the vignettes were written in bold. 
Dependent variables: Citizen attitudes. After participants read the vignettes, they rated 
their confidence, perceived importance, and trust in their hometown local government. 
Also, their emotional valence, whether they feel positive or negative, toward their local 
government was measured. Cronbach’s alpha for the four items measuring citizen 
attitudes toward their hometown local government was 0.80, which indicates a high 
                                                 
5 Cronbach’s alpha for three items of psychological distance passes the recommended value of 0.6 for 
exploratory studies in social sciences (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & L., 2006; Hinton, Brownlow, 
McMurray, & Cozens, 2004) 
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internal consistency across the four questions. Therefore, the average attitude toward 
their local government (M = 5.15, s.d. = 1.06) was used in this essay. A t-test was used, 
checking whether the type of expectations and message orientations form different levels 
of citizen attitudes. There was no significant differences in citizen attitudes between 
normative and empirical expectation groups (Mnormative = 5.15 and Mempirical = 5.14; t(149) 
= -0.06, p-value = 0.95) and between ‘why’ and ‘how’ message orientation groups (Mwhy 
= 5.11 and Mhow = 5.18; t(149) = 0.39, p-value = 0.70).  
Control variables. Basic socioeconomic demographics were collected as control 
variables. In addition to age, gender, and race, control variables included political 
ideology (M = 2.98, s.d. = 1.19) ranging from 1, very liberal, to 5, very conservative. 
Finally, at the end of the survey experiment, perceived performance (M = 4.04, s.d. = 
0.89) of and satisfaction (M = 3.95, s.d. = 1.02) with their hometown local government 
performance6. 
Results and Discussion 
 STATA 14, a statistical software package, was used to manage the data and 
evaluate the hypotheses. A significance level of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests to 
conclude whether the null hypotheses were rejected or not. 
 Table 2-2 illustrates descriptive statistics for Arms 1 to 4. Between-subject 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on control variables and participants’ 
sense of familiarity with public services to see whether there were significantly different 
                                                 
6 Individuals’ perceived performance of and satisfaction with local public services were excluded. Although 
participants were asked to remember their perceived performance of and satisfaction with their local 
government’s work before taking this survey, still there is the possibility that the treatments and other 
survey questions shaping participants’ perceived performance of and satisfaction with public services, 
which biases the results. 
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features across groups. The control variables and participants’ sense of familiarity with 
public services across the groups were not statistically different from each other at the 5% 
significance level. In other words, results of significantly different results across groups 
may not be driven from the control variables and sense of familiarity with public 
services. 
  
Table 2-2 Descriptive statistics of Arm 1-4 
Variables 
Normative Expectations Empirical Expectations 
Why How Why How 
Arm 1 Arm 3 Arm 2 Arm 4 
Sample size 38 45 31 37 
Expectations (average) 4.21 (0.44) 4.19 (0.46) 3.61 (0.74) 3.63 (0.61) 
    Overall gov. performance 4.21 (0.62) 4.09 (0.63) 3.52 (0.77) 3.62 (0.83) 
    Traffic signal 4.47 (0.73) 4.49 (0.59) 3.90 (1.01) 3.78 (0.95) 
    Street cleanness 4.08 (0.71) 3.96 (0.85) 3.52 (0.89) 3.59 (0.72) 
    Sidewalk management 4.08 (0.54) 4.22 (0.67) 3.52 (1.03) 3.51 (0.77) 
Construal levels (average) 4.30 (1.18) 4.30 (1.13) 3.89 (1.21) 3.90 (1.15) 
    Social: closeness 5.03 (1.76) 4.87 (1.60) 4.42 (1.95) 4.24 (1.92) 
    Probability: likeliness 4.03 (1.37) 3.84 (1.31) 3.52 (1.43) 3.73 (1.41) 
    Time: Soon 3.84 (1.53) 4.18 1.47 3.74 (1.41) 3.73 (1.50) 
Attitudes (average) 5.09 (1.06) 5.21 (0.97) 5.14 (1.24) 5.14 (1.05) 
    Confidence 5.53 (1.33) 5.71 (1.24) 5.65 (1.80) 5.46 (1.37) 
    Emotional valence 4.5 (1.37) 4.8 (1.12) 4.68 (1.54) 4.81 (1.08) 
    Importance 5.68 (1.34) 5.69 (1.28) 5.61 (1.31) 5.51 (1.26) 
    Trust 4.63 (1.46) 4.62 (1.25) 4.61 (1.36) 4.78 (1.47) 
Control variables 
    Age 19.5 (2.96) 19.64 (2.26) 19.87 (3.14) 20.49 (7.95) 
    Gender (% of female) 0.39 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.84 (1.59) 0.76 (1.48) 
    Ideology 2.97 (1.30) 2.89 (1.23) 3.06 (1.12) 3.03 (1.12) 
    Perceived performance 3.92 (1.05) 4.02 (0.81) 4.26 0.89) 4 (0.82) 
    Satisfaction 3.82 (1.18) 3.82 (0.96) 4.19 (0.91) 4.05 (0.97) 
Familiarity (average) 4.76 (1.41) 4.60 (1.53) 4.38 (1.67) 4.77 (1.55) 
    Traffic signal 5.24 (1.72) 5.02 (1.79) 4.71 (1.90) 5.08 (1.69) 
    Road condition 5.08 (1.65) 4.82 (1.71) 4.52 (1.95) 5.05 (1.60) 
    Sidewalk condition 3.97 (1.68) 3.93 (1.81) 3.90 (1.83) 4.19 (1.85) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
The descriptive summary was calculated based on the participants who successfully 
completed the experiment. 
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Model 1: Expectations and Construal Levels 
The first hypothesis, whether normative expectations of public services bring a 
higher construal level than that of empirical expectations, was supported by the mean-
comparison t-test and a linear regression model. A between-subject t-test was used to 
compare construal levels in normative and empirical expectation groups. The participants 
who were primed with normative expectations had a significantly higher average 
construal level (M = 4.30, s.e. = 0.13) than the others who were primed with empirical 
expectations (M = 3.90, s.d. = 0.14; t(149) = – 2.12, p-value = 0.036). 
A linear regression model was used, which regressed construal levels based on the 
type of expectations subjected to the control variables and the sense of familiarity with 
public services. It is expressed as, 
Model 1: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
where individual i’s construal level (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) was regressed on the conditions of 
expectation types (𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖), which were subjected to the control variables and the 
sense of familiarity with public services (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖). When individual i was primed to hold 
normative expectations of public services, t was equal to 1, and the treatment condition 
became 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1𝑖𝑖. On the other hand, when individual i was primed to hold 
empirical expectations of public services, t was equal to 0, and the treatment condition 
became 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁0𝑖𝑖. The results of Model 1 are displayed in Table 2-3. 
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Table 2-3 Regression models to test Hypothesis 1 and 2 
VARIABLES 
Model 
1 & 3 
Model 
2-1 
Model 
2-2 Model 3    
Construal  
(Eq1) Attitudes Attitudes 
Expectation  
(Eq 2) 
Attitudes 
(Eq 3) 
      
Expectation Conditions 0.35** 0.09 - 0.53*** 0.31 
           (Normative = 1) (0.18) (0.23) - (0.10) (0.19) 
Message Orientations - 0.00 1.13** - -1.04 
           (Why = 1) - (0.26) (0.50) - (1.45) 
Expectation*Message - -0.20 - - -0.38 
 - (0.35) - - (0.33) 
Construal - - -0.32*** - -0.35*** 
 - - (0.08) - (0.08) 
Construal * Message - - -0.30** - -0.24* 
 - - (0.13) - (0.14) 
Expect Levels - - - - -0.18 
 - - - - (0.20) 
Expect Levels  
                 * Message - - - - 0.54* 
 - - - - (0.30) 
Age 0.05*** -0.05 -0.02 -0.03*** -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Gender      
     Female -0.25 0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 
    (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15) 
     Declined to answer -1.00 -0.04 -0.80* -0.03 -0.64 
 (1.09) (1.22) (0.66) (0.28) (0.76) 
Ideology -0.13 0.16** 0.12* 0.06 0.11* 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
Ethnicity (White = 0)      
     Black 0.52 -0.45 -0.23 -0.03 -0.31 
 (0.36) (0.29) (0.28) (0.16) (0.30) 
     Asian 0.22 0.08 0.23 0.32 0.18 
 (0.57) (0.41) (0.32) (0.22) (0.32) 
     Native American 1.19 -0.58 0.07 -0.50 0.43 
 (1.05) (1.30) (0.69) (0.58) (0.54) 
     Hispanic 0.28 -0.11 0.07 -0.26 -0.06 
 (0.28) (0.49) (0.49) (0.18) (0.50) 
     Decline/Don’t know 1.09*** -0.67 -0.02 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.40) (0.76) (0.56) (0.14) (0.53) 
Familiarity -0.26*** 0.19*** 0.07 -0.01 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
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Table 2-3 Regression models to test Hypothesis 1 and 2 (continued) 
VARIABLES 
Model 
1 & 3 
Model 
2-1 
Model 
2-2 Model 3    
Construal  
(Eq1) Attitudes Attitudes 
Expectation  
(Eq 2) 
Attitudes 
(Eq 3) 
      
Constant 4.63*** 4.75*** 6.38*** 4.20*** 7.02*** 
 (0.50) (0.70) (0.60) (0.23) (1.08) 
      
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 
Adjusted-R2 0.219 0.155 0.391 0.315 0.416 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to the results from the t-test, the results of Model 1 also illustrated varying 
levels of construal between the normative and empirical expectation groups. Participants 
who were primed to hold normative expectations of public services tended to have a 
higher construal level than those who were primed with empirical expectations of public 
services. Interestingly, age and the sense of familiarity with public services had 
significant relationships with construal levels. Construal levels tended to increase when 
participants were older. The sense of familiarity had a negative relationship with 
construal levels, which is consistent with previous studies (Förster, 2009). The more 
participants felt familiar with the public services, the lower the level of construal they 
experienced. 
Discussion. The results suggest that people either holding normative or empirical 
expectations of public services went through distinct cognitive processes that led to 
varying degrees of psychological distance between themselves and their local 
government. Participants who were primed to hold normative expectations tended to 
think that they were less connected to their local government, and they thought that their 
local government would take more time on services that were less likely to meet their 
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expectations. The results could provide a clue to the results of James’ experiment (2011a) 
that participants holding normative expectations of public services mainly used 
information about good previous government performance, while individuals primed with 
empirical (positive) expectations used information of both good and poor prior 
government performance. One explanation for the results, based on the current 
experiment, is that normative expectations made individuals focus on the desirability of 
public services and the idea of the ‘excellent’ state of public services. This mental state 
could lead them to consume information of good performance more readily than poor 
previous government performance. On the other hand, empirical expectations might lead 
individuals to consider situations and contexts of public service delivery, relaxing the 
idea of ‘excellent’ government performance, and suggest that they might consider both 
poor and strong government performance. 
Model 2: Expectations, Message Orientations, Construal Levels and Attitudes 
 A 2-by-2 between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used on 
participants’ attitudes toward their hometown local government. The ANOVA results 
indicate that the second hypothesis, whether there is an interaction effect of expectations 
and message orientations on attitudes toward their local government, was not supported. 
There were no significant main effects of expectation types (F(1, 150) < 0.01, p-value = 
0.97) and message orientations (F(1, 150) = 0.13, p-value = 0.72) on attitudes toward 
their hometown local government. Also, there was no significant interaction between 
expectation types and message orientation (F(1, 150) = 0.11, p-value = 0.74). 
 While controlling the socio-demographic factors and the sense of familiarity with 
public services, two linear regression models were used to evaluate the relationships 
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among expectations, message orientations, and attitudes. Model 2-1 includes the 
treatment conditions of expectations and message orientations. Since the current study 
hypothesized that the information about government performance would have different 
relationships with citizen attitudes because of varying levels of construal, Model 2-2 
included individual i’s construal level (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) instead of i’s conditions of 
expectations. The models are expressed as,  
Model 2-1: 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 
 Model 2-2: 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖 
where individual i’s attitudes (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) were regressed on the conditions of expectation 
types (𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖), message orientations (𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖), and the interaction of both 
(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖), which were subjected to the control variables and the 
sense of familiarity with public services (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖). When individual i was primed to hold 
normative expectations, t was equal to 1, and the treatment condition for expectations 
became 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1𝑖𝑖. Otherwise, when individual i was primed to hold empirical 
expectation, t was equal to 0, and the treatment condition for expectations became 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁0𝑖𝑖. For the treatment of message orientation, m, was equal to 1 when 
individual i received ‘why’ message (𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁1𝑖𝑖). When participants read ‘how’ their 
local government delivered public services, m was equal to 0 (𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁0𝑖𝑖). 
 Based on the results in Model 2-1, the second hypothesis is not supported. Similar 
to the results of ANOVA, the treatment of expectation types and message orientations did 
not have a significant relationship with attitudes toward hometown local government. 
Ideology, however, had a significant relationship with attitudes toward the local 
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government, meaning participants who thought of themselves as conservative were likely 
to hold more positive attitudes toward their local government. Again, ones who felt more 
familiar with the public services were inclined to report positive attitudes toward their 
local government. 
On the other hand, the results in Model 2-2 provides a different story from the 
results in the ANOVA and Model 2-1. However, the results in Model 2-2 should be 
interpreted with caution since there can be other ways to explain the results, such as 
emotions, rather than just construal level theory. These other explanations are discussed 
later. First, the results would be described regarding construal levels. 
The results in Model 2-2 showed the significant main effects of construal levels 
and message orientations about government performance, as well as the interaction 
effects of the two on participants’ attitudes toward their hometown local government, 
while controlling for other factors. Participants’ construal levels tended to have a 
negative relationship with attitudes toward their hometown local government. Individuals 
who tended to consider the desirability of public services and think in abstract ways were 
likely to be less confident in, have less trust in, and have more negative attitudes toward 
their local government than those who were inclined to consider the feasibility of public 
services and think in more detailed terms. Participants who read ‘why’ their local 
government delivered public services reported more positive attitudes to the local 
government than those who read ‘how’ their local government provided public services. 
Interestingly, the interaction between construal levels and message orientations 
had a negative relationship with attitudes, which is against the second hypothesis. Figure 
2-3. illustrated that the attitudes of the group who read the ‘why’ message became more 
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negative as individuals’ construal levels increased compared to those who read the ‘how’ 
message. Initially, it was expected that people who hold higher construal levels would 
form more positive attitudes toward their local government when they read the ‘why’ 
message than those who read the ‘how’ message, while people who experienced lower 
construal levels would have more positive attitudes when they read the ‘how’ message 
than those who read the ‘why’ message. 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Fitted values and lines of attitudes based on Model 2-2 
 
Discussion. Attitudes toward one’s hometown local government were not affected by the 
treatments of expectation types and message orientation or by the interaction between the 
two. However, their mental mechanisms and formed expectations induced by normative 
and empirical expectations of public services seem to be related to their attitudes toward 
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the local government. Construal levels had negative relationships with attitudes toward 
one’s local government. People thinking in more abstract and holistic ways tended to 
trust less in and be less confident with their local government. They thought their local 
government was less important and felt less positive of their government performance. 
However, this may be the case because of the items that measured construal 
levels. For instance, the questions that measured psychological distance were how much 
the participant felt connected to their local government and how soon and likely their 
local government would meet their expectations. In the current essay, the higher construal 
level participants had, the less they felt connected and the less they thought their local 
government was likely to meet their expectations. Moreover, the higher construal level 
they held, the more they thought their local government would need time to meet their 
expectations. However, participants could feel bad when they feel distant from their local 
government. As a consequence, the construal levels had negative relationships with 
attitudes toward the local government. 
Model 3: Construal Levels and Averaged Expectations as Mediators 
 Based on hypotheses 1 and 2, the current study expected that the levels of 
construal and expectations might play a role as mediators. The first hypothesis expected 
that normative and empirical expectations of public services would form different 
construal levels. The second hypothesis assumes that the first hypothesis is true, and the 
message orientations will bring different attitude levels because of different construal 
levels. In addition, the degrees of expectations generated by the priming could influence 
participants’ attitudes toward their local government (James, 2011a). Thus, construal 
levels and expectation levels would mediate the effects of priming expectations. On the 
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other hand, message orientations would moderate the relationship between priming 
expectation types and attitudes, construal levels and attitudes, and expectation levels and 
attitudes. Multiple linear regression models were used to fully evaluate Model 37. Hence, 
Model 3 can be expressed as, 
 
Eq 1) Mediator 1: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖 
Eq 2) Mediator 2: 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀3𝑖𝑖 
Eq3) Mediated-Moderation:  
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖+ 𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛿𝛿𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀4𝑖𝑖 
 
The dependent variables for Eq 1) and Eq 2) are mediators that individual i’s 
construal levels (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) and averaged expectation levels (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) mediate the 
relationships between the treatment of expectation types (𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) and individual 
i’s attitudes toward the local government (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖). Socio-demographic factors and the 
sense of familiarity of public services (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) were controlled. Eq 3) expresses the role of 
interactions in the model: the interactions between message orientation (𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) and 
construal levels (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖), averaged expectation levels (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖), and expectation treatments (𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖). 
                                                 
7 A path analysis, which sets up paths among variables and uses observed variables instead of latent 
variables, is used to evaluate mediation models. Its advantage is relaxing the assumption of multivariate 
normality that a structural equation model has. However, a path analysis assumes homoscedasticity. It does 
not apply the robust variance estimator that corrects heteroscedasticity. Since the method is not different 
from running multiple linear regression models at the same time without applying the robust variance 
estimator, the current study separately used linear regression models applying the robust variance estimator.   
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 In Table 2-4, the results in Model 1 are Eq 1).  The results of Eq 2) suggest that 
the averaged expectation levels were higher for those holding normative expectations of 
public services than those holding empirical expectations of public services. Age had a 
negative relationship with expectation level. The sense of familiarity with public services 
did not have a significant relationship with the average expectation levels. 
 Eq 3) of Model 3 demonstrates interesting results. Similar to the results of Model 
2-2, construal levels had negative relationships with attitudes toward hometown local 
government. The more participants felt their hometown local government was further 
away from them, the more negative attitudes toward the local government they reported. 
There were marginally significant negative effects of the interaction between mental 
representations and message orientations on participants’ attitudes toward their 
hometown local government (p-value = 0.09). This goes against the second hypothesis 
that people in a matching condition between mental mechanisms and the content of the 
messages related to government performance would be likely to report more positive 
attitudes toward their local government than those in a mismatch condition. Again, 
compared to those who were primed with empirical expectations, attitudes of the 
participants who were primed with normative expectations decreased at a higher rate 
when the psychological distance increased with marginal significance. 
Although the level of average expectation did not have significant relationships 
with attitudes, there were positive effects of the interaction between averaged expectation 
levels and message orientations. As Figure 2-4. illustrated, the effect of average 
expectation levels on attitudes was different from the ‘why’ message group and the ‘how’ 
message group. Among the participants whose average expectation levels were low, 
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participants in the ‘how’ message group tended to be more positive toward their local 
government than those in the ‘why’ message group. On the contrary, among the 
participants whose average expectation levels were high, the attitudes of the individuals 
who read the ‘why’ message were more positive compared to those who read the ‘how’ 
message. Finally, the expectation treatments and message orientations did not have main 
effects and interaction effects on attitudes. 
 
 
Figure 2-4. The effect of interaction between expectation levels and message orientation 
on attitudes 
 
Discussion. Although it was the opposite of what was hypothesized, interestingly 
psychological distance and message orientation interacted and marginally influenced 
attitudes toward the local government. Also, average expectation levels induced by the 
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expectation conditions and message orientations interacted and marginally affected 
attitudes toward the local government. Compared to those who read the ‘how’ message 
related to government performance, the slope that reflects the relationship between the 
psychological distance and attitude, and between average expectation levels and attitude 
was steeper among participants who read the ‘why’ message related to the provision of 
public services. This means people’s attitudes toward their hometown local government 
in the ‘why’ message group were more responsive to their psychological distance than 
those in the ‘how’ message group. It is possible that the ‘how’ message provided 
contextual settings that canceled out the effect of the ‘excellent’ condition of public 
services. Moreover, the ‘why’ message may have assisted individuals in focusing on the 
‘excellent’ conditions and their belief structure and made them compare current 
conditions and excellent conditions. 
Conclusion 
This essay suggests that different types of information about the provision of 
public services (‘why’ and ‘how’ messages) moderated the relationships between 
different types of expectations (normative and empirical expectations) and attitudes 
toward governments because of distinct mental mechanisms related to types of 
expectations. Based on the between-subject t-tests, ANOVAs, and linear regressions, the 
current study suggests that people hold different mental mechanisms depending on the 
type of expectations related to public services. Such mental states can lead individuals to 
differently understand and consume information related to public services and form 
attitudes toward their government. 
 39 
 
 
There are several limitations of this essay. One is that it is not clear whether 
construal levels played a role in forming attitudes toward governments. Although there is 
a lot of empirical evidence of a close relationship between psychological distance and 
construal levels, the three items assessing psychological distance that are supposed to 
measure construal levels might not measure what was initially intended. Furthermore, the 
questions themselves could prime individuals to have negative emotional valence toward 
the government.  
Another limitation concerns how individuals’ chronic tendencies of construal 
levels, expectations, and attitudes toward their local government play out in the current 
experiment. To minimize such influences, the current study randomly assigned 
treatments, which made the treatments in this essay exogenous. However, since 
expectations and attitudes are some components of belief structures that are built over a 
period of time, along with experiences (Olson & Dover, 1976, 1979), these tendencies 
could interact with the treatments and produce construal levels, levels of expectation 
related to public services, and attitudes toward the local government. Also, people 
intuitively make decisions and form attitudes toward political issues based on their 
predispositions, such way of thinking and beliefs (Arceneaux & Vander Wielden, 2017). 
Therefore, in future research, measuring and including prior expectation levels related to 
government performance, construal levels, and attitudes toward governments without 
affecting the treatment is necessary to deepen the understanding of dynamics among 
expectations, construal levels, and attitudes. 
In addition, in the current experiment, the relationship between the two mediators, 
cognitive mechanisms and expectation levels cannot be determined. This study could not 
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demonstrate whether individuals’ mental states were first induced and then generated 
expectation levels or vice versa. Also, both could be independent from each other, or they 
may interact and influence attitudes toward a local government. Further evaluations of 
the relationship between these two, and their effects on citizen attitudes toward a local 
government, need to be studied to identify full causal relationships and to study how 
individuals understand government performance. Uncovering these mechanisms could 
provide potential interventions for public managers to more effectively communicate 
with citizens. 
Also, positive and negative feelings could play a role before the message 
orientation treatment and influenced citizen attitudes toward governments. For instance, 
people primed with normative expectations formed criteria related to the idea of excellent 
condition. Then, they could compare the perceived quality of the public services to their 
normative expectations and became unhappy with their government. On the contrary, 
people primed with empirical expectations could be less likely to form criteria related to 
the excellent condition of public services, compare, and become unhappy, since they 
focus more on the feasibility of public. These emotional valences could interact with the 
messages related to public services and influence attitudes toward governments. 
Depending on the features of public services (e.g., political issues and saliencies), 
expectations, and mental mechanisms, information related to public services may play 
different roles in forming attitudes toward government performance. For instance, 
political issues and policies that are highly polarizing and salient at a given time may tap 
into ideologies, reflecting individuals’ strong beliefs. This may lead to different types of 
expectations and mental states, forming individuals’ attitudes toward governments. 
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Another approach to such a study is to consider public services provided by 
different levels of government. The current study used local public services that people 
would use daily. However, people might not know much about the services that were 
provided by the federal government. Thus, the idea that people could easily picture 
themselves using the local public services might have led people to hold a lower 
construal level and be more responsive to the ‘why’ message than the ‘how’ message. On 
the contrary, when dealing with public services provided by the federal government, the 
‘how’ message might play a larger role than the ‘why’ message because the services are 
more abstract and far away from them. 
Nevertheless, with the limitations mentioned above, the current essay tried to 
discover whether people have different ways of thinking when they focus on certain types 
of expectations. Using an experimental research, this essay suggests causal relationships 
among expectation types, construal levels, message orientations, and attitudes, adding a 
relatively novel approach to examining citizen satisfaction. Analysis at the level of an 
individual’s cognitive activities in particular could suggest how to manage citizens’ 
expectations better and communicate more effectively with citizens. Knowing which 
thinking processes people go through may help predict what type of information could be 
most effective in attaining desired outcomes. 
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Chapter 3 
Different Mind Sets, Different Evaluations of Government Performance: An 
Experimental Test of Differences between Abstract and Concrete Thinkers in 
Affecting Citizen Satisfaction with Government Performance 
 
As governments have been stressing the importance of efficiency of public 
programs and government accountability, performance evaluations of public programs 
have become one of the main research interests among scholars in public administration. 
However, measuring and evaluating the outcomes of government performance is difficult 
(Wilson, 1989). One approach to evaluate the outcomes is to consider citizen satisfaction 
with public services since citizen satisfaction serves as an indicator of the quality of 
government performance (Van Ryzin, 2013) and the accountability of governments 
(Hood, 1995; Kaboolian, 1998). To study citizen satisfaction with public services, a 
series of studies has applied the expectancy-disconfirmation model, which suggests 
citizen satisfaction with public services is closely related to the relative differences 
between expectations and perceived performance of public services (James, 2009; 
Morgeson, 2013; Petrovsky, Mok, & Leon-Cazares, 2017; Poister & Thomas, 2011; Roch 
& Poister, 2006; Van Ryzin, 2004).  
Furthermore, along with a movement that studies citizens attitudes toward 
government performance at the micro-citizen level, some researchers have expanded the 
model by assessing its antecedents, boundary conditions, and limitations of citizen 
satisfaction studies (Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; Jacobsen et al., 2015) by applying the 
theories of psychology to the public administration studies (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 
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2017; Tummers et al., 2016). Likewise, this essay aims to assess boundary conditions 
related to individual mental mechanisms. In other words, this paper suggests that people 
holding distinctive cognitive mechanisms may consider different aspects of government 
performance and reach different levels of satisfaction with such performance. Thus, an 
experiment was conducted to examine the interactions between distinctive ways of 
thinking and the dynamics among citizen expectations of, perceived performance of, and 
satisfaction with public services.  
One approach to consider the way individuals judge their satisfaction with public 
services is to investigate how individuals construe a subject. Some people think in 
abstract terms and consider the general ‘big picture,’ while others think in concrete terms 
and focus on specific contextual factors. For instance, Liberman et al. (2002) suggest 
construal level theory, which describes that people tend to understand a subject or an 
event at different levels of abstractness. This indicates that people go through different 
thinking processes depending on these levels. Combining construal level theory and the 
expectancy-disconfirmation model will help scholars understand what aspects related to 
government performance citizens focus on and how they evaluate the qualities of public 
services via those focuses. Considering the mental mechanisms in citizen satisfaction 
studies may further help researchers identify factors that moderate the relationships 
among citizen expectations of, perceived performance of, and satisfaction with public 
services.  
The next section introduces the studies of citizen satisfaction that used the 
expectancy-disconfirmation model. The following section explains construal level theory. 
Afterward, the potential interactions between construal level theory and the expectancy-
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disconfirmation model are discussed. Then, the subsequent sections describe the 
experimental design and results. 
Citizen Satisfaction: Using the Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model 
Understanding citizens’ perceptions of and attitudes toward government 
performance have become important factors in public administration since citizens’ role 
in the society has changed. Citizens are now considered as active consumers of public 
services and collaborators in the co-production of public services with governments, 
rather than simply passive service receivers. Therefore, inputs from citizens and their 
attitudes, such as citizen satisfaction with government performance, are essential to 
consider in the public sector. 
Also, citizen satisfaction means more than an index of public service quality as 
citizen satisfaction with government performance has close relationships with political 
behaviors and other attitudes toward those governments. Based on satisfaction with 
government performance, citizens would engage in political actions that are difficult for 
government incumbents to ignore. For instance, dissatisfied citizens tended to punish 
incumbents by voting against them (Boyne, James, John, & Petrovsky, 2009). 
Dissatisfied citizens also were likely to exercise their ‘voice’ by complaining, protesting, 
and engaging in collective actions to express their dissatisfaction with the public services 
(Hirschman, 1970a; Lyons, Lowery, & DeHoog, 1992a). With the awareness of the 
importance of citizen satisfaction in public administration, many scholars have used the 
expectancy-disconfirmation model to study internal psychological mechanisms of citizen 
satisfaction. 
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Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model 
The expectancy-disconfirmation model explains how people reach satisfaction 
judgments as a result of three determinants: expectations of public services, perceived 
performance of the services, and the difference between the two (Oliver, 1977, 1980, 
2010b; Spreng, MacKenzie, & Olshavsky, 1996). People tend to have higher satisfaction 
with public services when the perceived performance of public services meets or exceeds 
their initial expectations of the services (positive disconfirmation), and they are likely to 
be dissatisfied when perceived performance falls short of their expectations related to 
public services. As the model was initially developed to examine consumer behavior 
related to private goods, many scholars in public administration have tested the relevance 
of the expectancy-disconfirmation model with public services provided by various levels 
of governments (Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; James, 2009; Petrovsky et al., 2017; 
Poister & Thomas, 2011; Roch & Poister, 2006; Van Ryzin, 2004, 2013). 
An expectation of public services is an individual’s anticipation of the quality of 
public services. It functions as a reference point in the model, which helps individuals 
compare and evaluate services. Depending on the types of expectations that consumers 
hold, it has mixed relationships with satisfaction with a service. For instance, normative 
expectations have negative direct relationships with satisfaction (James, 2009; Poister & 
Thomas, 2011), while empirical expectations have positive direct relationships with 
satisfaction (Morgeson, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2004).  
Perceived performance of government performance is consumers’ evaluation of 
the service quality. Studies have illustrated the positive direct relationships between 
perceived performance of public services with satisfaction with the services (Van Ryzin, 
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2006, 2013). The relationship between expectations and perceived performance related to 
government performance plays an essential role in the model. Disconfirmation, the 
difference between expectations and perceived performance, determines satisfaction with 
government performance (James, 2009, 2011b; Petrovsky et al., 2017; Van Ryzin 2013). 
Individuals tend to be satisfied when the performance of public services exceeds their 
expectations of the services (positive disconfirmation), while they are likely to be 
dissatisfied when the performance does not meet their expectations (negative 
disconfirmation). 
Moreover, there is an emerging trend incorporating the concepts of cognitive and 
social psychology in understanding the mechanisms of how citizens form expectations of 
public services and evaluate government performance. In fact, the expectancy-
disconfirmation model is susceptible to heuristics (Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; James, 
2009), survey designs (Van de Walle & Van Ryzin, 2011), and priming effects 
(Hjortskov, 2017). In other words, people are not free from their unconscious and 
cognitive biases. Hence, studying how individuals’ mental mechanisms play a role in the 
evaluation of public services is needed. Construal level theory, whether people think in 
abstract or detailed terms could provide insights into the field of citizen satisfaction. 
Mental Mechanisms to Consider: Construal Level Theory 
There are diverse ways for understanding how individuals to think, consider, and 
understand information related to subjects, actions, events, and their surroundings. In 
fact, some people tend to focus on the ‘big picture’ or the forest, while some others are 
inclined to consider details or the individual tree. Construal level theory explains that 
people who think in abstract or detailed terms tend to think in different ways related to 
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perceptions, actions, and judgments when confronted with stimuli that are close than 
other stimuli that are distant from them (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Nira 
Liberman, 2010). 
Construal level refers to a mental frame (Liberman & Förster, 2009; Liberman et 
al., 2002; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
This explains that people in a higher construal level think about the ‘big’ picture and have 
a ‘forest’ oriented mindset, and people in a lower construal level are ‘detailed-oriented’ 
and have an ‘individual tree’ oriented mindset. Individuals in a higher construal level are 
inclined to focus on common general features among subjects, while others holding a 
lower construal level are likely to focus on unique features of each subject (Liberman et 
al., 2002). For instance, when a list of edible materials was provided to participants, 
individuals who held a higher construal level tended to categorize them as ‘food.’ On the 
other hand, those in a lower construal level were inclined to categorize them as ‘meals,’ 
‘snacks,’ or ‘drinks.’ 
Construal level theory is closely related to individuals’ goal-orientations. For 
instance, varying levels of construal lead individuals to consider distinct aspects of 
actions (Liberman & Trope, 1998). People in higher construal levels consider the goal 
and desirability of an action. For example, these citizens think about why governments 
provide public services. On the contrary, people in lower construal levels consider the 
contexts of service delivery and the feasibility of the action. Citizens who understand 
things in concrete-terms think about how governments provide public services. 
Also, construal levels are related to ones’ sensitivity to surrounding contexts 
(Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2010). On average, higher construal levels led individuals to 
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be goal-oriented. Thus, they tended to control themselves and followed a plan to achieve 
their goals. Lower construal levels tended to drive people to consider about their 
situations, to be less goal-oriented, and to diverge from a plan. In other words, people in a 
higher construal level would be less susceptible to the contexts and situations they would 
be in and focus on the goal more so than those in a lower construal level. 
In addition, several studies have suggested the possibility of close relationships 
between individuals’ construal level and satisfaction. Goodsell (2004) observed that 
citizens who experienced a service tended to be more satisfied with public services than 
citizens without such experience. Since people were likely to form lower construal levels 
for familiar things than for new stimuli (Förster, 2009), the results of Goodsell’s study 
(2004) suggest that users become more satisfied with services that they are familiar, and 
they process their experiences with these services through lower levels of construal. In 
other words, citizens reach different levels of satisfaction with public services because 
they have evaluated and judged the services in different ways. 
Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model and Construal Level Theory 
This essay proposes that the distinct thinking processes by construal levels 
moderate the dynamics among citizens’ expectations, perceived performance, and 
satisfaction with public services. Construal levels may affect expectations. People with a 
higher construal level may become goal-oriented and form their expectations about 
public services (a reference point) while considering the desirability of the services. For 
instance, a higher construal level can lead individuals to think of what government 
performance should be. Although individuals have different ideas about the ideal role of 
public agencies, citizens tend to have a clear and stable belief about how well 
 49 
 
 
governments should perform. On the contrary, people holding a lower construal level 
may build expectations of public services based on the contextual factors and focus on 
the feasibility of services, which may lead them to have varying levels of expectation of 
government performance. Thus, the hypotheses related to expectations of public services 
are, 
H1a: Participants primed to have a higher construal levels will have higher 
expectations of public services than those primed to hold a lower construal level; 
H1b: The variance in expectations of people primed to hold a higher construal 
level will be lower than those of the others primed to have a lower construal level.  
In addition, citizens’ perceptions of government performance could systematically 
vary between high and low levels of construal (Liviatana, Trope, & Liberman, 2008; 
Trope & Liberman, 2010). In a higher construal level, people tend to evaluate others’ 
performances based on the core features of service outcomes, like the high quality of 
government performance that improves citizen life satisfaction. Since it is difficult to 
achieve a high quality of public services, people are likely to judge government 
performance as low. Contrarily, at a lower construal level, people may assess others’ 
work based on peripheral features of public services, such as the circumstantial 
conditions of service deliveries, and would be sufficiently satisfied by the provided 
public services. Citizens who think the contexts of public service delivery, such as 
economic depressions, challenges the governments to provide the services would form 
less negative attitudes toward government performance because there is a relevant reason 
for governments to perform less than expected. Since people in a lower construal level 
tend to factor in contexts and their experiences when making judgments related to 
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government performance, which vary from individual to individual, the variance of 
perceived performance of individuals in a lower construal level will be greater than those 
in a higher construal level. Thus, the second hypotheses were, 
H2a: Participants primed to have a higher construal level will report lower 
perceived performance of public services than those primed to hold a lower 
construal level; 
H2b: The variance of perceived performance of participants primed to have a 
higher construal level will be smaller than those of those primed to hold a lower 
construal level. 
Based on the first and second hypotheses, I expected that the disconfirmation of 
perceived performance and expectations would differ from the higher to the lower 
construal level conditions. Since I expected that people who were primed to have higher 
construal levels would have higher expectations, it is more likely for their perceived 
performance to fall short and lead to little or even negative disconfirmation. On the other 
hand, the perceived performance of people who were primed to hold lower construal 
levels could have a range of disconfirmations since they were more likely to factor in 
situations and their experiences. Thus, the third hypotheses were, 
H3a: The mean of disconfirmation will be lower for the higher construal group 
than the lower construal group; 
H3b: The variance of disconfirmation will be smaller for the higher construal 
group than the lower construal group. 
By combining construal level theory and the expectancy-disconfirmation model, I 
expected distinct relational patterns among the expectations, perceived performance, and 
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satisfaction depending on the construal levels that individuals had at the time. Thus, the 
fourth hypothesis to test was, 
H4: The construal levels will moderate the relationships among expectations, 
perceived performance, and satisfaction with public services. 
Experimental Design and Measurements 
 This essay is one of the first pieces of research to assess the role of mental 
representation in citizen satisfaction with government performance. The experiment 
compared two groups of participants who were primed to hold either a higher or a lower 
construal level. Figure 3-1. illustrates the procedure of the experiment. To help 
participants to engage in the experiment, they were instructed that the survey was about 
the performance of their hometown local government. 
 A control condition, neither priming a higher nor a lower construal level, was not 
included for two reasons. First, the purpose of this essay was to examine the different 
patterns in citizen evaluation processes of government performance, rather than 
estimating the absolute estimation of the treatment effects. Another reason was that not 
priming a construal level does not necessarily mean people have a middle level of 
construal. The measured construal level might reflect individuals’ chronicle tendency of 
construal levels or some unknown information in the primed message. 
 Also, following previous research (Kim et al., 2009; Liberman, Trope, Macrae, et 
al., 2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), this paper primed construal levels and measured 
those primed construal levels through manipulating and measuring individuals’ 
psychological distance to the website operated by their hometown local government. The 
previous studies have consistently demonstrated the close relationship between construal 
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levels and psychological distance in the dimensions of time, social, probability, and 
physical distance (Fiedler, 2007; Freitas et al., 2008; Kim & John, 2008; Liberman et al., 
2002; Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Mandel, 2003; Nan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 
2010). For instance, a lower construal level (detailed thinking) is associated with the 
sense of being psychologically near, whereas a higher construal level (abstract thinking) 
is linked with the sense of being psychologically distant.  
General procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to two groups. The vignettes 
were about launching a website rub by their hometown local government where citizens 
could report the defects of their community to their local government. One group was 
informed that the website was planned to be launched ‘a year later’ (higher construal 
condition) whereas another group read that it was already launched (lower construal 
condition). Since the treatment was exogenous, the mean and variance differences in the 
averaged psychological distance are highly likely to be caused by the treatment. 
After reading the vignettes, participants’ construal levels were measured. Then, 
their expectations of, perceived performance of, and satisfaction with the public services 
were measured. Also, participants’ age, gender, ideology, and race were included as 
control variables at the end of the study. For more detailed measurements, see Table A 
B1 in Appendix B. 
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Figure 3-1. The experimental design to test the expectancy-disconfirmation model and 
the construal model. This figure illustrates the general procedure of the experiment. 
 
Participants. I recruited students enrolled in Applications of Statistics in Psychology 
(PSY 216-009), Abnormal Psychology (PSY 333-001), and Senior Thesis Research (PSY 
496-001) for the 2018 spring semester at the University of Kentucky. Forty-nine students 
were initially recruited, and seven did not finish the experiment. Thus, 42 participants 
were included in the analysis. Table 3-1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of all the 
variables. 
Measure the trust in government and the sense of familiarity  
with public services (N = 48) 
: Management of traffic signal systems, sidewalks, and street cleanness 
Measure construal level with psychological distance (N = 45) 
: Three participants in Arm 2 did not continue 
Arm 1 (N = 22) 
Message 
(Higher construal condition) 
: Will be launched in Next year 
Arm 2 (N = 26) 
Message 
(Lower construal condition) 
: Is Now provided 
Socio-Demographic Control Variables (N = 42) 
Measure Expectations, Perceived Performance, & Satisfaction (N = 42) 
      : One participant in Arm 1 did not continue after answering construal 
        levels 
      : One participant in Arm 2 did not continue after answering expectations 
      : One participant in Arm 2 did not continue after answering perceived 
        performance 
Invite respondents and randomly assign (N = 49) 
: One agreed to participate but did not continued the study 
 54 
 
 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the higher construal condition or 
the lower construal condition; there were 21 participants for each condition. The groups 
included 33 females8 (19 in the high construal condition and 14 in the low construal 
condition), 7 males (2 in the high construal condition and 5 in the low construal 
condition), and 2 individuals declined to answer in the high construal condition. There 
were 34 white9 students (16 in the high construal and 18 in the low construal condition) 
and 8 non-white students (3 in the high construal and 5 in the low construal condition). 
There was no significant difference in age, ideology, trust in government, or the sense of 
familiarity between the high construal and the low conditions. 
Measurements: Trust and familiarity. This essay controlled for individuals’ trust in 
government, which might have relationships with citizen satisfaction or perceived 
performance related to government performance. Also, the sense of familiarity with 
public services, which might have relationships with their construal levels, was controlled 
for. Participants were asked to rate the level of their trust and familiarity with public 
services via a 7-point Likert scale. The sense of familiarity with the traffic signal systems, 
road conditions, and sidewalk conditions was separately measured. 
 Cronbach's alpha for the three items measuring the familiarity with public 
services was 0.83, suggesting high internal consistency. Thus, an index was created that 
averaged the three items and used the averaged familiarity with public services to test the 
hypotheses. 
                                                 
8 Based on a one-tailed t-test, the high construal condition had significantly higher proportion of females 
compared to those of the low construal condition (t = -1.92; p-value = 0.03). The difference was marginally 
not significant in a two-tailed t-test (p-value= 0.06). 
9 The proportion of white students in each condition were not significantly different based on a two-tailed t-
test (t = 0.77; p-value = 0.44). 
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Manipulation check: Construal levels. After instructing participants to read a vignette, 
there was a check to see whether the treatment manipulated their construal levels. 
Participants answered how soon they thought the website would start and how likely they 
would download the website via a 7-point Likert scale. Another item, asking how many 
times they would report defects in the community through the website was recorded with 
an 11-point Likert scale. Since the scales were in different ranges, the ratings for each 
item were transformed into z-scores. Compared to the group primed to hold a lower 
construal level, participants holding a higher construal level would report that the website 
would start later, they would be less likely to download the website, and would be less 
likely to report defects through the website. 
 Cronbach’s alpha for the items measuring how much they were likely to 
download the website and to report defects through the website was 0.75, which indicates 
relatively high internal consistency10. Thus, the index for construal levels was created by 
averaging the standardized scores of individuals’ likely to download and frequencies of 
reports. 
Expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction. Because of the small sample 
size, the order of blocks and the items presented within each block were not randomly 
presented. All participants rated their expectations of public services, followed by 
reporting perceived performance of the services, and finally they judged their satisfaction 
with the services provided by their hometown local government via 7-point Likert scales. 
Within each block, the order of the items started from the overall quality of public 
                                                 
10 Cronbach’s alpha for the three items that measure construal levels was 0.50, which is lower 
than the rule of thumb, 0.60 (Hair et al., 2006; Hinton et al., 2004). However, excluding the item that 
measures how soon they think the program will be launched increased Cronbach’s alpha to 0.75. 
Thus, the item reflecting the temporal dimension of psychological distance was not included. 
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services, traffic signal systems, road conditions, and sidewalk conditions. The sample 
size of 42 participants was not large enough for randomization to cancel out the noise. 
With small sample size, randomizing the order of questions would introduce noise that 
would decrease a chance to detect meaningful patterns. 
 Disconfirmations were calculated as the ratings of perceived performance of 
public services minus those of expectations that align with each public service. For 
instance, the disconfirmation between the perceived performance and expectations of 
road conditions was calculated as the perceived performance level of road conditions 
minus the expectation levels of road conditions. A positive disconfirmation means 
perceived performance exceeds expectations, whereas a negative disconfirmation means 
perceived performance fell short of expectations. 
Control variables: Socio-demographic characteristics. Age, gender, ethnicity, and 
ideology were measured as control variables. Gender and ethnicity were included as 
dummy variables. Female was coded as 1 and male and non-reporters as 0. Self-reported 
white individuals were coded as 1 and all others as 0. Individuals’ ideology was 
measured in a 5-point Likert scale, from 1, very liberal, to 5, very conservative. 
Methods 
To test whether the manipulation induced different levels of construal, the 
standardized construal level was regressed upon the treatment condition and other control 
variables. The averaged familiarity of public services was included in the regressions. 
The model for this was, 
 
Model 1: 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + +𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
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Where an individual i was asked to answer questions related to public services (ps), such 
as the overall quality of public services, traffic signal systems, road conditions, and 
sidewalk conditions. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is whether a person i received the treatment to hold a 
higher or a lower construal level. When a person i read the vignette that their hometown 
local government would launch a website a year later, t is equal to 1 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,1). 
When a person i read the vignette that their hometown local government just now 
launched the website, t is equal to 0 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,0). 
To test whether the distinct relational patterns among expectations, perceived 
performance, and satisfaction related to public services based on the high construal to the 
low construal condition, I regressed satisfaction on the condition dummy variable and the 
interactions between condition and expectations and between condition and 
disconfirmation. The coefficients of interaction terms reflect the distinct patterns of 
relationship depending on the treatment. The model was, 
 
Model 2: 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 +𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 +𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
 
 Since I expected that the different relational patterns would exist because of 
different construal levels primed by the treatment, the level of construal was included in 
the models instead of the treatment conditions. Thus, the model was, 
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Model 3: 
𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆�𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 +𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 +𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
 
If different relational patterns based on the treatment conditions and the construal 
levels exist, the interaction terms, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 in Model 2 and Model 3, would be 
significantly different from zero.  
Results 
 Table 3-1 illustrates the results of the manipulation check. The treatment of the 
vignettes did not have significant relationships with construal levels. In other words, the 
treatment was not effective enough or it was insufficient to make a difference in 
individuals’ construal level. Another possible explanation is the three items measuring 
psychological distance might fail to measure individuals’ construal level11. Instead, 
individuals’ ideology had marginally significant relationships with their psychological 
distance related to the website, p-value ranging from 0.019 to 0.09. Except for the time 
dimensions of psychological distance, the more people were conservative, the more 
distant they felt related to the website. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Since it is ambiguous what the index created from participants’ psychological distance related to the 
website means, this essay interprets the results in terms of psychological distance instead construal levels. 
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Table 3-1 Manipulation check: Regress psychological distance on the treatment and 
control variables 
Variables Psychological Distance Time 
Likely to 
Download Report 
Condition -0.01 (0.30) 0.17 (0.35) -0.25 (0.31) 0.23 (0.38) 
Familiarity 0.10 (0.09) -0.05 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.08 (0.10) 
Trust in Gov. -0.17 (0.16) 0.11 (0.22) -0.02 (0.16) -0.32 (0.20) 
Age 0.07 (0.09) -0.03 (0.11) 0.06 (0.09) 0.07 (0.11) 
Female -0.36 (0.37) 0.11 (0.37) -0.43 (0.45) -0.29 (0.36) 
Ideology 0.38** (0.15) -0.32* (0.19) 0.35** (0.15) 0.40* (0.22) 
White -0.57 (0.35) 0.39 (0.50) -0.90** (0.36) -0.24 (0.43) 
     
Constant -1.07 (1.77) 0.57 (2.06) -1.31 (2.00) -0.83 (2.02) 
Adjusted-R2 0.887 0.102 0.208 0.194 
* p-value < 0.10; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01 
 
 To discover whether there were significant mean and variance differences 
between the psychologically distant and near groups, the two-tailed t-test was used to test 
the mean differences, and Levene’s robustness test (Levene, 1960) was used to evaluate 
the variance differences. The mean and variance differences in expectations, perceived 
performance, disconfirmations, and satisfaction about public services are illustrated in 
Table 3-2. 
All the means were not significantly different from the psychologically distant 
group to the psychologically near group, except the disconfirmation of the overall quality 
of public services. People who were primed to feel distant from the website tended to 
have a positive disconfirmation, while those primed to feel near to the website were 
likely to have a negative disconfirmation. However, on average, the expectations of the 
overall quality of public services and their satisfaction with sidewalk conditions were 
significantly higher for the psychologically distant group than the psychologically near 
group, based on the one-tailed t-test. 
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Another way to test whether the mean and variance of individuals were different 
depending on the psychological distance related to the website was creating a dummy 
variable based on the actual psychological distance to the website individuals already 
had. Thus, the dummy variable was coded as 1 when the standardized psychological 
distances were over 0, and all otherwise were coded as 0. Twenty participants were 
categorized as psychologically distant, and 22 were categorized as psychologically near. 
There were no significant mean differences in expectations of public services, but people 
feeling distant from the website had a larger variance related to the overall quality 
(Varhigh = 1.55; Varlow = 0.91; p-value = 0.02). There were no significant mean 
differences in perceived performance of public services, but people feeling distant from 
the website had a smaller variance related to the sidewalk conditions (Varhigh = 1.10; 
Varlow = 1.70; p-value = 0.02). Related to disconfirmations, compared to individuals 
feeling near to the website, participants feeling distant from the website had positive 
disconfirmation related to traffic signal systems (Mhigh = 0.00; Mlow = -0.77; p-value = 
0.04). Related to the overall quality of government performance, people feeling distant 
from the website marginally had a larger variance than those feeling near to the website 
(Varhigh = 1.19; Varlow = 0.79; p-value = 0.08). In general, the third hypotheses were not 
supported. 
 
Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics and mean and variance comparisons between the 
conditions 
Variables Total Distant Condition 
Near  
Condition 
Two-tailed 
p-values 
Trust in Gov. 4.67 
(0.95) 
4.81 
(0.75) 
4.52 
(1.12) 0.34 
Familiarity 
      Averaged 
4.68 
(1.56) 
4.57 
(1.52) 
4.79 
(1.63) 0.65 
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Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics and mean and variance comparisons between the 
conditions (continued) 
Variables Total Distant Condition 
Near  
Condition 
Two-tailed 
p-values 
     Traffic signal 4.83 
(2.11) 
4.86 
(1.96) 
4.81 
(2.29) 0.94 
     Road 4.86 
(1.59) 
4.71 
(1.65) 
5.00 
(1.55) 0.57 
     Sidewalk 4.36 
(1.71) 
4.14 
(1.56) 
4.57 
(1.86) 0.42 
Construal level 
    Averaged (z-score) 
0.01 
(0.90) 
0.02 
(0.85) 
0.003 
(0.97) 0.96 
    Temporal (z-score) -0.09 
(0.96) 
-0.04 
(0.97) 
-0.13 
(0.98) 0.77 
    Likelihood (z-score) 0.03 
(1.00) 
-0.06 
(0.92) 
0.12 
(1.09) 0.57 
    Report (z-score) -0.01 
(1.01) 
0.10 
(1.00) 
-0.11 
(1.04) 0.52 
Expectations 
     Overall 
4.55 
(1.27) 
4.90 
(1.18) 
4.19 
(1.29) 
0.07* 
(0.80) 
     Traffic signal 5.24 
(1.23) 
5.38 
(1.24) 
5.10 
(1.22) 
0.46 
(0.85) 
     Road 4.64 
(1.34) 
4.81 
(1.44) 
4.48 
(1.25) 
0.43 
(0.38) 
     Sidewalk 4.36 
(1.48) 
4.52 
(1.40) 
4.19 
(1.57) 
0.47 
(0.56) 
Perceived performance 
     Overall 
4.79 
(0.95) 
4.67 
(0.91) 
4.90 
(1.00) 
0.42 
(0.39) 
     Traffic signal 4.83 
(1.34) 
4.71 
(1.35) 
4.95 
(1.36) 
0.57 
(0.88) 
     Road 4.33 
(1.14) 
4.52 
(1.12) 
4.14 
(1.15) 
0.29 
(0.95) 
     Sidewalk 4.36 
(1.45) 
4.71 
(1.42) 
4.00 
(1.41) 
0.11 
(0.92) 
Satisfaction 
     Overall 
4.60 
(0.94) 
4.76 
(0.70) 
4.43 
(1.12) 
0.26 
(0.10)* 
     Traffic Signal 4.79 
(1.32) 
4.71 
(1.19) 
4.86 
(1.46) 
0.73 
(0.35) 
     Road 4.36 
(1.32) 
4.57 
(1.25) 
4.14 
(1.39) 
0.30 
(0.41) 
     Sidewalk 4.48 
(1.35) 
4.86 
(1.20) 
4.10 
(1.41) 
0.07* 
(0.60) 
Disconfirmation 
     Overall 
0.24 
(1.01) 
0.71 
(0.96) 
-0.24 
(0.83) 
0.00*** 
(0.98) 
     Traffic signal -0.40 
(1.21) 
-0.14 
(0.73) 
-0.67 
(1.53) 
0.16 
(0.04)** 
 62 
 
 
Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics and mean and variance comparisons between the 
conditions (continued) 
Variables Total Distant Condition 
Near  
Condition 
Two-tailed 
p-values 
     Road -0.31 
(1.16) 
-0.33 
(1.20) 
-0.29 
(1.15) 
0.90 
(0.90) 
     Sidewalk 0.00 
(1.29) 
-0.19 
(1.44) 
0.19 
(1.12) 
0.34 
(0.95) 
Sociodemographic 
     Age 
19.90 
(1.65) 
19.90 
(1.79) 
19.90 
(1.55) 1.00 
     Gender (Female) 0.79 
(0.42) 
0 .90 
(0.30) 
0.67 
(0.68) 0.06 
     Ethnicity (White) 0.81 
(0.40) 
0.76 
(0.44) 
0.86 
(0.36) 0.44 
     Ideology 2.26 
(0.89) 
2.43 
(1.08) 
2.10 
(0.62) 0.23 
* p-value < 0.10; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01 
p-values in parentheses indicates the significance of differences between variances of 
the psychologically distant and near group. The values are based on Levene’s robust 
test statistics. 
 
 The results of Model 2 and Model 3 are displayed in Table 3-3. The dependent 
variables, participants’ satisfaction with the four aspects of government performance, 
were treated as continuous variables. In Model 2, there was a significant treatment effect 
on satisfaction with the overall quality of public services, but not others. Participants who 
were assigned to read that the website would be launched a year later were 2.64 units 
more satisfied in a 7-point Likert scale than those who read that the government program 
was already launched. In Model 3, there were mixed results related to the relationships 
between psychological distance and satisfaction with public services. The standardized 
psychological distance had negative relationships with satisfaction with the overall 
quality of public services and traffic signal systems. The further distance from the 
website individuals felt, the less satisfaction with the overall quality and traffic signal 
systems they reported. On the other hand, in terms of the road conditions, there was a 
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significant positive relationship between the psycholgical distance and satisfaction. The 
closer to the website participants felt, the more satisfied they were with the road 
conditions. 
In general, disconfirmations, which were perceived performance minus 
expectations of public services, were positively related to satisfaction with government 
performance, supporting the expectancy-disconfirmation model. The higher people rated 
perceived performance than their expectations of public services, the more satisfied with 
the public services they were. In Model 2, when the expectations were fixed, the 
satisfaction with the overall quality and road conditions increased by 0.62 and 0.92 for 
each, as the ratings of perceived performance increased by a unit. In Model 3 testing of 
the effects of standardized psychological distance, the satisfaction with the traffic signal 
system and road conditions increased by 0.66 and 0.84 of each, as perceived performance 
increased by one unit. 
The results related to the relational patterns based on the treatment condition and 
the psychological distance indicates the role of the treatments and the mental mechanisms 
in the expectancy-disconfirmation model. Related to the overall quality of public 
services, the treatment marginally moderated the relationships between expectations and 
satisfaction and between disconfirmation and satisfaction at the 10-percent significance 
level. Compared to individuals who were primed to feel near to the website, participants 
who were primed to feel distant from the website experienced a lesser effect of 
expectations and disconfirmation on satisfaction with overall qualities of public services. 
On average, the effect size of expectations of overall government performance was 0.27 
for participants in the distant-message group, but 0.78 for those in the near-message 
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group. The effect size of disconfirmation related to overall government performance was 
-0.21 for the distant-message group, but 0.62 for the near-message group. In other words, 
the satisfaction of the people in distant-message group decreased even when the 
perceived performance exceeded expectations. 
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Table 3-3 OLS models, treating satisfaction as continuous variables 
VARIABLES 
Overall Quality Traffic Signal Road Condition Sidewalk Condition 
Model 2 
Condition 
Model 3 
Construal 
Model 2 
Condition 
Model 3 
Construal 
Model 2 
Condition 
Model 3 
Construal 
Model 2 
Condition 
Model 3 
Construal 
         
Condition (HC = 1) 2.64** - 1.14 - -0.15 - -0.45 - 
 (1.26) - (1.01) - (1.39) - (0.80) - 
Psy. Distance - -1.41** - -1.13** - 1.35*** - -0.14 
 - (0.62) - (0.55) - (0.49) - (0.76) 
Expectations 0.78*** 0.44*** 1.07*** 1.00*** 0.94*** 1.06*** 0.51*** 0.64*** 
 (0.23) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.24) (0.10) (0.17) (0.13) 
Condition -0.51** - -0.25 - 0.05 - 0.21 - 
* Expectations (0.25) - (0.20) - (0.30) - (0.19) - 
Psy. Distance - 0.30** - 0.24** - -0.27** - 0.09 
* Expectations - (0.13) - (0.11) - (0.11) - (0.17) 
Disconfirmation 0.62** 0.14 0.26 0.66*** 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.54 0.51* 
 (0.30) (0.15) (0.19) (0.11) (0.24) (0.14) (0.35) (0.27) 
Condition -0.83* - 0.40* - -0.29 - -0.15 - 
* Disconfirmation (0.41) - (0.22) - (0.36) - (0.36) - 
Psy. Distance - 0.31 - 0.14 - -0.19 - -0.25 
* Disconfirmation - (0.30) - (0.23) - (0.15) - (0.24) 
Familiarity 0.07 0.06 -0.13 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.16) 
Trust in Gov. 0.29 0.36** 0.13 0.16 -0.00 0.26* -0.25 -0.14 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.25) (0.27) 
Age -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.16* -0.11 -0.14* 0.13 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Female 0.07 -0.08 0.20 0.08 -0.47 -0.14 -0.21 -0.00 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.22) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.51) (0.58) 
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Table 3-3 OLS Models, treating satisfaction as continuous variables (continued) 
VARIABLES Overall Quality Traffic Signal Road Condition Sidewalk Condition Condition Construal Condition Construal Condition Construal Condition Construal 
Ideology -0.08 -0.18 0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.12 0.14 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) 
White 0.08 0.16 -0.33 -0.27 -0.26 -0.11 0.11 0.05 
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.33) (0.29) (0.30) (0.39) (0.35) 
Constant -0.40 1.50 2.33 3.17* 3.57* 2.13 0.54 1.26 
 (1.86) (1.61) (1.78) (1.85) (1.88) (1.42) (1.80) (1.44) 
         
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Adjusted-R2 0.555 0.546 0.776 0.764 0.751 0.786 0.600 0.626 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The psychological distance significantly moderated the relationship between 
expectations and satisfaction with public services except for sidewalk conditions. The 
effect sizes of expectations on satisfaction increased by 0.30 for the overall quality of 
public services and 0.24 for traffic signal systems, but they decreased by 0.27 for road 
conditions when the standardized psychological distance increased by one standard 
deviation. There were no significant moderation effects of the standardized psychological 
distance on the relationship between disconfirmation and satisfaction. 
Control variables did not have significant effects on satisfaction except trust in 
government in the model that tested the relationship between the construal levels and 
satisfaction with overall qualities. The more individuals trust their hometown local 
government, the more they are satisfied with the overall qualities of public services. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The goal of this paper was to test whether distinct mental images bring about 
different relational patterns among expectations, perceived performance, disconfirmation, 
and satisfaction with government performance based on the expectancy-disconfirmation 
model. The concept of construal levels, thinking in abstract or detailed terms, was used to 
predict distinct relational patterns among key variables. Based on the results of regressing 
construal levels on the treatment, the treatment unsuccessfully manipulated participants’ 
construal levels. Instead, individuals’ ideology had significant relationships with the three 
items measuring psychological distance. When people were more conservative, they 
reported that the government website would be launched sooner (having lower construal 
levels), they would be less likely to download the program (having higher construal 
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levels), and they would be less likely to report defects through the program (having 
higher construal levels). 
 Overall, the results support the expectancy-disconfirmation model. Expectations 
and satisfaction with public services were positively related, meaning higher expectations 
lead people to have higher satisfaction. Also, disconfirmation and satisfaction had 
positive relationships. People who thought government performed better than what they 
expected tended to have higher satisfaction. As Oliver (1977, 1980) suggested, 
expectations functioned as reference points for individuals’ comparison of evaluation of 
service qualities and satisfaction. 
      Although there were no treatment effects on psychological distances related to 
the website and satisfaction with public services, except for the overall quality of 
government performance, the results suggest that the distinct ways of thinking played 
significant roles in the relationships among expectations, perceived performance, 
disconfirmation, and satisfaction related to public services. In particular, psychological 
distance had significant relationships with expectations. As psychological distance related 
to the website increased, the effect sizes of expectation on satisfaction with the overall 
quality of public services and traffic signal systems increased, whereas the effect sizes of 
expectations on satisfaction with road conditions decreased. In other words, 
psychological distance led people to think in different ways, which eventually affected 
satisfaction. Thus, this study demonstrated the initial stage of evidence that mental 
mechanisms might play an important role when people judge government performance. 
 There are limitations to this essay. First of all, the sample size was too small to 
randomize items within each block (asking participants’ expectations, perceived 
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performance, and satisfaction related to government performance) to test the hypotheses. 
Compared to the number of parameters tested in the models, a small sample size brings 
low statistical power (Button et al., 2013) and higher rates of Type 1 error (Forstmeier, 
Wagenmakers, & Parker, 2017). Thus, the results presented in this essay should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 Another limitation is related to the experimental design. Although the results 
indicate close relationships between psychological distance and expectations, it is 
possible that the experimental design measuring psychological distance before asking 
participants’ expectations of public services might cause the psychological distance to 
affect expectations. Therefore, answering the questions made individuals aware of how 
far for close they feel related to the government operated website. However, in the real-
world setting, psychological distance and construal levels may not have significant 
relationships with expectations. A model was run that treated the sense of familiarity with 
public services as individuals’ chronic tendency of construal levels since the sense of 
familiarity can be treated as an indicator of construal levels (Förster, 2009). The level of 
familiarity with public services did not moderate the effects of expectations and 
disconfirmation on satisfaction.  
Another possibility is that the items, which were designed to measure construal 
levels after the treatment, were not reflecting construal levels. There were no significant 
relationships between familiarity and construal levels. The item, how likely the individual 
will be to download and use the website, might reflect the level of individuals' active 
participation in their community instead of their construal levels. On the other hand, the 
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item might reflect how much individuals believe in their power to change their 
community through participation. 
Nevertheless, this essay suggests the potential role of distinctive mental 
mechanisms in evaluations of government performance. The psychological distance 
measures used in this paper seem to have a close relationship with expectations. 
However, there may be omitted variables, such as individuals’ beliefs related to the 
consequences of their actions or civic behaviors, which need to be considered in future 
studies.
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Chapter 4 
A Proposed Non-Linear Relationship of Satisfaction with Government Performance 
and Co-Production and an Initial Empirical Test 
 
Scholars and government officials have realized that the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services inherently and heavily rely on citizens’ collaborative 
behavior with governments’ production of public services, i.e., co-production. Thus, 
many public institutions encourage citizens to participate in the process of decision-
making and producing public services (Brandsen, Pestoff, & Verschuere, 2012), 
recognizing the benefits of the inputs from both professionals and citizens (Normann, 
1984; Ramirez, 1999). The benefits are improved quality and increased quantities of 
public services that citizens can consume, which enhances the efficiency of providing 
public services (Jakobsen, 2013; Ostrom, 1996; Thomsen, 2015). Since public managers 
and institutions can encourage citizen participation in the production and provision of 
public services, it is essential to know who is likely to co-produce public services with 
governments and why. 
In accordance with the emphasis on collaborations between citizens and officials 
in the provision of public services, some scholars have focused on the relationships 
among individual characteristics, psychological factors, and co-production. For instance, 
some studies demonstrated variables that had significant relationships with co-
production, such as individuals’ ability to co-produce and knowledge related to co-
production (Alford, 2002), self-efficacy (Thomsen, 2015), and attitudes toward 
government performance (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 2013). Although 
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researchers have recently recognized the need for empirical approaches to study citizen 
behavior in the provision of public services, there is still limited empirical research on 
citizen co-production. Thus, this paper mainly focuses on the relationship between citizen 
attitudes toward government performance and co-producing behavior. 
The goal of this paper is to suggest a model that evaluates the relationship 
between citizen attitudes (i.e., satisfaction with government performance) and citizen co-
production behavior. In detail, to evaluate the relationship between citizen satisfaction 
with government performance and co-production, a model is developed by drawing on 
the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the framework of prospect theory. The 
expectancy-disconfirmation model is a citizen satisfaction model that assesses the 
dynamic among expectations of, perceived performance of, and satisfaction with 
government performance. Prospect theory explains how individuals use heuristics when 
they make decisions under certain conditions. This paper is a starting point for thinking 
about who engages in co-production of public services and why they decide to co-
produce with public officials.  
In the next section, the concept of co-production and related existing studies are 
introduced. The following section discusses limitations of previous co-production 
research: little attention has been given to citizen satisfaction and its connection with co-
production. Next, prospect theory and the expectancy-disconfirmation model are 
reviewed. The following section develops a model that integrate the logic of the two 
theories. Based on the model, a potential non-linear relationship between citizen 
satisfaction and co-production is tested using the US data. Finally, the results and further 
research opportunities are discussed. 
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Co-production and Citizen Attitudes Toward Governments 
There have long been efforts by scholars in public administration to reach an 
agreed upon definition of citizen co-production. It is typically defined as the 
collaboration between public agents and citizens in which both contribute their resources 
to increase the quantity and improve the quality of public services (Brudney & England, 
1983; Ostrom, 1996; Parks et al., 1981). Here, citizens are voluntary participants in the 
process of public service production and active consumers of public services, rather than 
compelled compliers because of the punishments by regulations and passive receivers of 
public services. 
Many scholars agree that co-production creates public value for citizens, 
communities, and societies. Co-production is considered as an approach to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public services without significant increases in the costs 
of providing such services (Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013; Marschall, 2004; Osborne, 
Radnor, & Strokosch, 2016). For instance, students' school performance improved among 
those whose parents participated in school activities. Furthermore, co-production 
enhances government accountability (Ostrom, 1996), social capital (Alford, 2002), and 
the sense of citizenship and democratic governance (Dunston, Lee, Boud, Brodie, & 
Chiarella, 2009). With the recognition of the benefits of co-production, many countries, 
especially in Europe, have been incorporating co-production into their social policies and 
implementing the policies in various ways (Künzel, 2012; OECD, 2011). Hence, to 
effectively encourage citizens to co-produce public services together with public 
officials, knowing who co-produces is crucial to increasing the benefits of co-production. 
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However, who co-produces and how they co-produce depend on the 
characteristics of co-production activities. Since co-production is multi-dimensional, 
some scholars in public administrations have introduced typologies of co-production and 
demonstrated individual characteristics that are closely related to co-production. For 
instance, many studies used the typology of co-production developed by Brudney and 
England (1983). Their typology subdivides co-production into individual, group, and 
collective co-production based on the degree of inputs to and benefits from co-production 
activities. Among empirical studies, some found the individual citizens’ factors (i.e., the 
sense of self-efficacy, attitudes toward government performance and information about 
co-production activities, and socio-demographic characteristics of citizens) had 
distinctive relationships with their co-production behavior at individual and collective 
levels (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 2013).  
Although co-production has been widely applied in the public sector by public 
managers, surprisingly there are still relatively few quantitative studies (Brandsen & 
Honingh, 2016; Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2013). This is especially the case 
concerning the behavioral aspects of relationships between citizen attitudes toward 
government performance and citizen co-production. Several studies have evaluated the 
links between citizen attitudes and co-production and found a negative association 
between them (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 2013). In fact, citizens who were 
dissatisfied with government performance were more likely to co-produce. For instance, 
if one thinks the government performs well enough to protect the community, one may 
feel less obligated to pay attention to their surroundings and less likely to participate in a 
group patrolling the neighborhood. On the other hand, if one thinks the government is not 
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doing a good enough job protecting the community, one may feel more responsible for 
watching their neighborhood or attending the Citizen Police Academy. However, 
previous studies evaluated a linear relationship between citizen satisfaction with 
government performance and co-production, and they have paid limited attention to how 
and under what conditions citizens decide to co-produce public services. 
To empirically study who co-produces public services and how they reach a 
decision to co-produce, this essay connects citizens’ satisfaction with government 
performance and citizen co-producing behavior. Also, this study develops a model that 
incorporates the expectancy-disconfirmation model (Oliver, 1977, 1980) and the insights 
from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Prior studies have suggested 
the link between the two theories (Oliver, 2010a; Roch & Poister, 2006). The connection 
between the two theories will be explained in more detail after the brief introduction of 
the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the framework of prospect theory. 
The Link between the Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model and Prospect Theory 
Among many factors that encourage or discourage citizens to co-produce public 
services, citizen satisfaction with government performance needs to be considered in 
citizen co-production studies for several reasons. First, citizen satisfaction with 
government performance is closely related to political and civic behavior. For instance, 
citizens who were dissatisfied with government performance were likely to punish 
political incumbents by voting against them (Boyne et al., 2009) and ‘voice’ their 
dissatisfaction (Hirschman, 1970b; Lyons, Lowery, & DeHoog, 1992b).  Bovaird et al. 
(2015) found that citizen evaluations of government performance had a negative 
relationship with co-production. In a democratic society, this can later lead to questions 
 76 
 
 
about the legitimacy of a government. If the government, which is elected by citizens to 
represent them, repeatedly fails to perform what citizens ask, the government will lose 
authority and validity to govern. Hence, evaluating how satisfied and dissatisfied citizens 
co-produce is important. 
 However, there are few quantitative studies about the role of citizen satisfaction 
with government performance in co-production behavior. Furthermore, there are limited 
studies about citizen co-production that apply descriptive and behavioral approaches. 
Many behavioral theories proposes that citizens’ attitudes toward the government may 
not linearly transform into behavior, and it is hard to predict behavior based on attitudes 
(Corey, 1937; LaPiere, 1934). 
In this essay, I suggest a potential non-linear relationship between citizen 
satisfaction and co-production by combining the expectancy-disconfirmation model and 
the prospect theory framework. Also, this paper is part of a broader agenda to apply the 
prospect theory framework in public sector settings (Baekgaard, 2017; Moynihan & 
Lavertu, 2012; Vis & van Kersberge, 2007). In the next section, I introduce the 
expectancy-disconfirmation model and prospect theory. Then, I present a new model that 
incorporates the two and suggests a non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction 
with public services and citizen participation in co-production. 
Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model 
 Among researchers who study citizen satisfaction with government performance, 
some use the expectancy-disconfirmation model to examine the key determinants and 
causal relationships among the variables (James, 2009; Morgeson, 2013; Petrovsky et al., 
2017; Poister & Thomas, 2011; Van Ryzin, 2004, 2006). The expectancy-
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disconfirmation model was originally developed by Oliver (1977, 1980) to study the 
behavior of satisfied or dissatisfied consumers. The model explains the cognitive 
mechanisms of how individuals reach satisfaction once they consume a service or a 
product. The main contribution of the expectancy-disconfirmation model is to emphasize 
the role of expectations in consumer satisfaction. 
 Usually, many people think that the higher the quality of public services, the more 
individuals are satisfied, which is true in some degree. Surprisingly, there are cases in 
which citizens are dissatisfied with the good quality of public services or in which they 
satisfied with the poor performance of public services. The expectancy-disconfirmation 
model suggests perceived performance of public services does not linearly transform into 
satisfaction with the services because of expectations (Oliver, 1977). In this model, 
expectations of services function as criteria for individuals to compare perceived quality 
of public services. Therefore, individuals tend to be satisfied with public services when 
the perceived performance of the services exceeds expectations related to such services. 
On the other hand, citizens are likely to be dissatisfied with public services when the 
perceived performance of the services falls short of expectations. Thus, satisfaction with 
services is a function of the differences between expectations and perceived performance. 
Among the studies connecting citizen attitudes and co-production, some have 
found a negative linear relationship between citizen satisfaction with government 
performance and citizen co-production behavior (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 
2013). However, based on the framework of prospect theory, there are theoretical reasons 
for a non-linear relationship between citizen co-production behavior and citizen 
satisfaction with government performance. 
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Prospect Theory Framework 
  Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) developed the ground-breaking prospect 
theory that later became a primary foundation of behavioral economics. The theory 
explains decisions by individuals with bounded rationality when uncertainty and risk are 
involved. It is a descriptive theory that illustrates how individuals make decisions using 
heuristics, instead of how individuals make optimal decisions as normative theories 
suggest. Prospect theory has three rules related to people’s decision-making under 
uncertain situations: sensitivity to relative losses and gains, loss aversion, and 
diminishing sensitivity. The three rules will be explained after introducing the basic 
structure of prospect theory. 
First of all, understanding the structure of prospect theory is important, illustrated 
in Figure 4-1. The horizontal line shows the level of outcomes that individuals will 
receive as a result of their decisions. The vertical line is the level of value (utility) that 
they feel from the outcomes they receive. The intersection of the horizontal and vertical 
line is a reference point. A reference point is a default condition that functions as a 
standard. The right side of the reference point illustrates the outcomes that will add to 
individuals’ default level of outcomes, meaning they will gain based on their decisions. 
The left side of the reference point implies that the outcomes will deduct from 
individuals’ default level of outcomes, meaning they will lose based on their decisions.  
Values above the reference point reflects how much individuals value from the gains 
(positive utility), and below the reference point indicates how much people dislike the 
losses (negative utility). 
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Figure 4-1. The value function from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) 
 
The crucial contribution of prospect theory is the S-curve, which is drawn based 
on the three descriptive rules. The first rule, sensitivity to relative losses and gains, means 
that people make decisions based on how much they relatively will gain or lose from 
their default (a reference point), rather than considering the absolute level of end-
outcomes. Thus, the S-curve goes through the reference point, where individuals are in a 
neutral state. The second rule, loss aversion, means that individuals tend to react to the 
loss situation more than the gain situations. In other words, people strongly dislike a 
given loss more than they like the same amount of gain. Thus, the S-curve is asymmetric: 
there is a much steeper in slope in the loss area than the gain area. Finally, the third rule, 
diminishing sensitivity, indicates that the further away from the reference point people 
are, the less sensitive to an additional loss or gain. In the graph, the slope of the curve 
reflects sensitivity to gains and losses, with a steeper curve meaning that individuals are 
more sensitive to gains and losses. Thus, the levels of value increase for a gain and 
decrease for a loss near the reference point. However, the sizes of value-increase for 
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gains and the value-decrease for losses diminish when additional gains and losses happen 
far away from the reference point. Thus, the slope of the S-curve is steep near the 
reference point, and the slope gets flatter as the S-curve moves further away from the 
reference point. 
Combining the Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model into the Prospect Theory 
Framework 
 The framework of the value function from prospect theory can be used to explain 
citizen satisfaction since both models explain similar psychological processes individuals 
experience in decision-making. First, both models emphasize the role of criteria. Criteria 
are expectations in the expectancy-disconfirmation model (Oliver, 2010b) and reference 
points in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Second, the expectancy-
disconfirmation model explains that satisfaction is a function of the relative difference 
between expectations and perceived performance of services like the relationships among 
the reference point, losses and gains, and value levels (Oliver, 2010a; Roch & Poister, 
2006). Finally, the expectancy-disconfirmation model has empirically demonstrated that 
people were more sensitive to negative situations than to positive situations (James, 
2009). This is similar to loss aversion suggested by prospect theory. Compared to 
satisfied citizens, citizens dissatisfied with public services were more responsive to the 
difference between expectations and perceived performance of services. Based on these 
similarities between the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the prospect theory 
framework, I incorporate the key variables of the expectancy-disconfirmation model (i.e., 
expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction) into the prospect theory 
framework. 
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The logic of the expectancy-disconfirmation model, that people are likely to be 
satisfied when performance meets or exceeds their expectations but to be dissatisfied 
when perceived performance falls short of expectations, can be expressed as,  
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)    (1) 
where citizen 𝑁𝑁’s satisfaction with the public service 𝑗𝑗 (𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), is determined by individual 
𝑁𝑁’s expectations of the service 𝑗𝑗 (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), perceived performance (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), the disconfirmation of 
expectations and perceived performance (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and other covariates of individual i (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) 
and public service j’s characteristics (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖). 
 Below, Figure 4-2. shows the proposed new model, combining the key variables 
of the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the prospect theory framework. The 
horizontal line is the quality level of public services or government performance citizens 
perceive. It is the citizens’ perception of the quality of public services that they consume 
or they expect. The vertical line shows the level of satisfaction with public services 
(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). The intersection of the horizontal and vertical lines is the perceived quality of 
public services (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) that citizen consumed. The S-curve follows the rule of loss aversion 
and diminishing sensitivity. Expectations of public services (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are located where the S-
curve and the horizontal line meets.  
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Figure 4-2. A new model that incorporate the expectancy-disconfirmation model into the 
prospect theory framework 
 
Furthermore, Figure 4-3. shows satisfied and dissatisfied citizens. The S-curve on 
the left represents a citizen who is satisfied with public services. For instance, person A’s 
perceived quality of public services (where the vertical and horizontal lines intersect, 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) 
is higher than person A’s expectations (𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) of the services, meaning 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. Thus, 
person A is satisfied with what governments provide (where person A’s S-curve meets 
the vertical line, 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖). On the contrary, the S-curve on the right represents a citizen who 
is dissatisfied with public services. Person B’s perceived quality of public services 
(where the vertical and horizontal lines intersect, 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) is lower than person B’s 
expectations (𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) of the services, meaning 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 < 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖. Thus, person B is dissatisfied 
with what governments provide (where person B’s S-curve meets the vertical line, 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖). 
 
Level of Perceived 
Government Performance 
Satisfied 
Dissatisfied 
(Higher/better) 
(Lower/worse) 
 
Expectation 
Perceived 
performance 
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Figure 4-3. Comparing satisfied and dissatisfied cases 
 
The Relationship between Citizen Satisfaction with Public Services and Citizen Co-
Production 
Let’s say that both person A and person B equally participate in co-production 
and improve the quality of public services, from the level of 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  & 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 to the level of 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖. 
With improved quality of public services, both person A’s and person B’s satisfaction 
increases. In this paper, the relationship between citizen satisfaction and co-production is 
expressed as,  
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾(∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)    (2) 
where citizens 𝑁𝑁 decides to co-produce (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) depending on their expected changes in 
satisfaction with the improved public service 𝑗𝑗 (∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) through their co-production, along 
with other covariates of the individual 𝑁𝑁 (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) and public services characteristics 𝑗𝑗 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖). The 
expected changes in individuals’ satisfaction are the differences between citizen 
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satisfaction with government performance before their co-production and after their co-
production [∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸�𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� − 𝐸𝐸�𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�~𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�]. In other words, people will decide 
to co-produce to improve government performance and expect their satisfaction level will 
increase. 
 However, the size of increase in satisfaction varies. As Figure 4-3. depicts, person 
B’s satisfaction level increases more than that of person A’s. In other words, dissatisfied 
citizens (person B) have more motivation to participate in co-production than satisfied 
citizens (person A) since dissatisfied citizens obtain more psychological benefits from co-
production than satisfied citizens (∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 > ∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖). Thus, the first hypothesis to test is, 
H1: Dissatisfied citizens will be disproportionately more likely to co-produce than 
neutral and satisfied citizens. 
 In addition, the third rule of prospect theory, diminishing sensitivity, provides 
new insights into the relationship between citizen satisfaction with public services and 
citizen co-production behavior. Diminishing sensitivity, becoming less sensitive to the 
changes further away from the reference point, suggests that people who are moderately 
dissatisfied and satisfied will behave differently from those who are very dissatisfied and 
satisfied. Citizens, in the extreme, might be less motivated to co-produce because they 
are receiving less psychological benefits from their activities, compared to those who are 
in the moderate range of satisfaction with public services. Thus, the second hypothesis is,  
H2: There will be a non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction and co-
production in that moderately dissatisfied and satisfied people are more likely to co-
produce than those in the extreme. 
 85 
 
 
Assumptions. This paper builds the model and hypotheses based on several assumptions. 
One is that co-production and perceived performance of public services (or expected 
future perceived performance) have a positive relationship. People will expect that their 
collaboration and cooperation with their government will improve the quality of public 
services. The second assumption is that people can predict how their satisfaction will 
increase based on the expected improved quality of public services. Based on the 
proposed model, the expected improved performance will, in turn, lead people to expect 
higher satisfaction when the expectations are constant. Finally, the expected changes in 
satisfaction and co-production have monotonic direct relationships. The more individuals 
expect larger increases in satisfaction as a result of their co-production, the more they are 
willing to co-produce. The proposing non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction 
with government performance and co-production is based on Equation (1) and expected 
changes of satisfaction (∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are based on Equation (2). The expected changes of 
citizen satisfaction follow the framework of prospect theory. 
 Another assumption of this paper is that citizens are aware of the benefits of co-
production, and they are willing to co-produce to enjoy those benefits. One of the 
important issues in citizen co-production is public-good problems, such as free-riding. In 
reality, not everybody wants to co-produce in the provision of public services since it is 
costly to do such activities. Individuals have to spend their time and efforts when they 
participate in decision-making and collaborating with others. In particular, the tendencies 
to free-ride, enjoying the benefits from others’ co-production efforts, make the problem 
worse (Olsen, 1965; Pestoff, 2012). Ostrom (2000) suggested that the social system, such 
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as social norms and beliefs in others’ contributions and the existence of punishments for 
free-riders, could encourage and discourage citizens’ participation in co-production.  
Although the cost of co-production for citizens, social norms and free-riding are 
important issues to address, they are beyond the scope of this paper. To proceed, the 
assumption is that the level of benefits is independent of the costs, in order to focus on 
the benefits of co-production.  
Data 
To test the hypotheses, this paper uses a sample collected in 2014 of United States 
residents. Parrado et al. (2013) and Bovaird et al. (2015) studied co-production at the 
individual level in European countries. However, it is important to know how U.S. 
citizens co-produce at the individual level since the administrative culture and political 
system are different from the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. 
The data was collected from June 26th to July 6th in 2014 in the United States 
through AmericasBarometer studies (source http://www.AmericasBarometer.org). A 
multilevel probabilistic design and stratification methods were applied based on regions, 
municipality size, and rural and urban areas within municipalities. One person per 
household who was eligible to vote participated in the survey. People who were 
institutionalized in prison, a boarding school, or a hospital, were not included. 
The descriptive statistics for individuals’ socioeconomic demographics are 
summarized in Table A C 1 and Table A C 2 in Appendix C. The number of observations 
to test the hypotheses is 548, based on 753 observations in the survey version measuring 
satisfaction, of which 136 observations are missing because either their children did not 
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attend school, did not use health services, or both in the past 12 months at the time they 
took this survey. There are an additional 69 missing values from the main and control 
variables. 
Methods 
This essay creates indices for the dependent and explanatory variables. The items 
were selected for the variables based on the results of Cronbach’s alpha and principal 
component factor analysis with orthogonal rotation. The process is described in detail in 
Table A C 3 in the Appendix. In addition, see Table A C 4 in the Appendix C for detailed 
summary statistics for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political 
institutions. Tables 4-1 reports the descriptive summaries for co-production, citizen 
satisfaction with public services, trust in political institutions, and approval of president’s 
work. 
The dependent variable is co-production, which is measured by whether the 
respondents attended meetings as a form of citizen participation in the provision of public 
services. Attending meetings is considered as co-production because meetings cover 
aspects of all four dimensions of co-production (APSE, 2013; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; 
Bovaird, 2007; Bovaird & Löffler, 2010; Weinberger & Jütting, 2001). Through 
attendance, individuals can prioritize policies and public services (co-commissioning), 
discuss improvement in the public services (co-design) based on their experiences and 
evaluations (co-assessment), and learn how to use the services (co-delivery) 
appropriately. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for attending a municipal or 
parents’ association meeting at least once. There are 321 observations (58.58%) who 
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never participated in a meeting and 227 observations (41.42%) who attended at least one 
meeting. 
The main explanatory variable is citizen satisfaction with public services. Citizen 
satisfaction is an additive index of the ratings of individual satisfaction with public 
services in five areas: satisfaction for the democracy in the state and the quality of police 
performance, roads, public school services, and health services. The satisfaction with the 
US democratic system is included since it reflects individuals’ “support for the way the 
democratic regime works in practice” (Linde & Ekman, 2003). The additive index of 
citizen satisfaction ranges from 5, very dissatisfied with all five domains, to 20, very 
satisfied with all five domains. Furthermore, a dummy variable for dissatisfaction is 
created. Based on the neutral state which is the middle of the satisfaction range from 
level 5 to level 20, the dummy variable is coded as 1 for dissatisfied or very dissatisfied 
people whose satisfaction rating is lower than neutral level or 12.5, while it is coded 0 for 
people whose satisfaction rating is greater than 12.5. The questions that measure co-
production and citizen satisfaction are listed in Appendix C Table A C 4. 
Control variables are trust in political institutions and socioeconomic 
demographics. An index for trust in political institutions is created by averaging six items 
(see Table A C 3 in Appendix). Citizen attitudes toward the government are controlled 
since individuals’ perceptions of government performance have a positive relationship 
with co-production (Bovaird et al., 2015). In this paper, only individuals’ perceived 
performance of President Obama is available that reflects individuals’ attitudes toward 
the government. Other socioeconomic variables are included, such as age (Bovaird et al., 
2015), gender (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005), education level (Egerton, 2002), and 
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working status (Wilson & Musick, 1997). Other demographic variables, such as marital 
status, the number of people in one’s household, monthly income level, religion, race, 
regional areas, ideology, partisanship, are included as well. 
 
 
Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics of co-production and citizen satisfaction 
Variables Mean Linearized SD Min Max 
Co-production 0.42 0.06 0 Never 
1 
Co-produce 
Citizen satisfaction 13.27 0.14 
5 
Very 
dissatisfied 
20 
Very 
satisfied 
Dissatisfaction 0.35 0.01 0 Satisfied 
1 
Dissatisfied 
Trust in political 
institutions 3.65 0.14 
1 
Not at all 
7 
A lot 
Approval of President’s 
work 3.22 0.09 
1 
Not at all 
7 
A lot 
  
Results 
Two models were used to test the hypotheses. Model 1 tests whether there is 
negativity bias by including the dummy variable for dissatisfaction. Model 2 evaluates 
whether there is a negative quadratic relationship between citizen satisfaction and co-
production by including a quadratic term for citizen satisfaction. The results are reported 
in Table 4-2. Since this essay is exploratory, the interest is in the direction of 
relationships, not in testing causation. 
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Table 4-2 The results of Model 1 and Model 2 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Dissatisfied Quadratic 
   
Dissatisfied -0.28*** (0.08) - 
Satisfaction - 0.18*** (0.05) 
Satisfaction Squared - -0.01** (0.00) 
Trust in political institutions 0.07 (0.06) 0.08 (0.07) 
Approval of President's work -0.15* (0.08) -0.16 (0.08) 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
No. of people in household 0.13* (0.07) 0.12* (0.07) 
Female 0.17 (0.12) 0.16 (0.12) 
Marital Status (Single) 
       In a relationship 0.17 (0.13) 0.15 (0.12) 
       Widowed & Separated 0.39*** (0.12) 0.39*** (0.11) 
Monthly Income ($2,720 or less) 
       Middle: $2,721 - $5,325 -0.06 (0.11) -0.07 (0.12) 
       High: $5,326 or more 0.15 (0.15) 0.15 (0.14) 
Education (high school or less) 
       College 0.04 (0.18) 0.05 (0.18) 
       Post Graduate 0.47* (0.23) 0.48* (0.24) 
In Labor Force 0.15* (0.16) 0.14 (0.16) 
Ideology 0.07 (0.04) 0.08* (0.04) 
Partisanship (Others) 
       Republican 0.04 (0.28) 0.02 (0.28) 
       Democrat -0.14 (0.33) -0.16 (0.32) 
       Independent 0.11 (0.27) 0.09 (0.27) 
Religion (Catholic) 
       Protestant -0.02 (0.11) -0.03 (0.11) 
       No-religion -0.04 (0.18) -0.04 (0.17) 
       Others -0.23 (0.15) -0.25 (0.16) 
Ethnicity (White) 
       Black 0.49 (0.32) 0.5053 (0.312) 
       Hispanic 0.34 (0.37) 0.3146 (0.364) 
       Others 0.08 (0.44) 0.0819 (0.427) 
Areas (West) 
       Midwest -0.41** (0.14) -0.41** (0.14) 
       Northeast -0.22 (0.16) -0.24 (0.15) 
       South 0.03 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 
   
Constant -1.21* (0.61) -2.66*** (0.70) 
   
Observations 548 548 
Linearized standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The first hypothesis – that people dissatisfied with the public services will co-
produce more – is not supported. People who are dissatisfied with the public services 
were less likely to co-produce than the people who are satisfied with it. The results from 
Model 2 suggests that citizen satisfaction and co-production had a negative quadratic 
relationship. In other words, being in a certain range of citizen satisfaction will increase 
the probability of individuals to co-produce. However, after a certain point of the level of 
citizen satisfaction, an increase in citizen satisfaction decreases the probability of citizen 
participation in co-production. The estimated point of highest probability or 0.46 is at 
16.4 satisfaction level in which the negative of the linear coefficient divided by twice the 
quadratic coefficient, about 0.1801/0.0110, with a standard error 2.88. In other words, 
with 95% probability the range of satisfaction level from 10.78 to 22.06 contains the true 
population value of maximum probability of co-production. 
The main focus of this paper is to observe the variability in the probability of co-
production relative to citizen satisfaction. However, certain values need to be assigned to 
other control variables to predict the probability. There are two ways to determine the 
values. The most common way is to calculate the means over the total sample for each 
control variable and predict the relationships between dependent and explanatory 
variables. However, this may not reflect the characteristics of the sample used in this 
essay since the subgroups for a given level of satisfaction may have different 
characteristics from each other. The second method addresses this issue by using the 
mean of other covariates conditional on satisfaction levels. In this case, the estimated 
probability of co-production arises from citizen satisfaction or from changes in other 
variables which are correlated with satisfaction. The estimated probability of co-
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production is reported in Table 4-3, first with unconditional means and the second with 
means conditional on satisfaction. 
For convenience, Table 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show the estimated probability of co-
production at the points of citizen satisfaction with public services holding others at 
means (see Table A C 5 in Appendix C for means of margins for total observations and 
subpopulations). Figure 4-4. A and C show the margins while other variables are fixed at 
averages of total observations. The margins in Figure 4-4. B and D are estimated based 
on the characteristics of subpopulations of satisfaction. For example, to estimate the 
margin for 'satisfied' in Figure 4-4. B, the estimated margins of the probability of co-
production are based on the means of the covariates of the 353 observations who are 
'satisfied.' Thus, the estimated margins in Figure 4-4. C and 4-4. D reflect the actual data 
better than the Figure 4-4. A and C. 
 
 
Table 4-3 Predicted probability of co-production under the condition of citizen 
satisfaction for Model 1 and Model 2 
Variables Unconditional Means Conditional Means 
Each Subgroup 
Observations 
Model 1: Dissatisfied 
    Not Dissatisfied 0.46*** (0.03) 0.49*** (0.03) 353 
    Dissatisfied 0.35*** (0.01) 0.30*** (0.02) 195 
Model 2: Quadratic 
    Very Dissatisfied 5 0.21*** (0.04) 0.14* (0.07) 3 
    Satisfaction 6 0.24*** (0.04) 0.32*** (0.09) 3 
    Satisfaction 7 0.28*** (0.03) 0.20*** (0.03) 9 
    Satisfaction 8 0.31*** (0.03) 0.12*** (0.02) 12 
    Satisfaction 9 0.34*** (0.02) 0.21*** (0.04) 25 
    Satisfaction 10 0.37*** (0.01) 0.33*** (0.03) 44 
    Satisfaction 11 0.40*** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.02) 47 
    Satisfaction 12 0.42*** (0.01) 0.40*** (0.03) 52 
    Satisfaction 13 0.43*** (0.02) 0.42*** (0.02) 85 
    Satisfaction 14 0.45*** (0.03) 0.42*** (0.01) 85 
    Satisfaction 15 0.45*** (0.03) 0.48*** (0.04) 85 
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Table 4-3 Predicted probability of co-production under the condition of citizen 
satisfaction for Model 1 and Model 2 (continued) 
Variables Unconditional Means Conditional Means 
Each Subgroup 
Observations 
    Satisfaction 16 0.46*** (0.05) 0.61*** (0.05) 35 
    Satisfaction 17 0.46*** (0.06) 0.55*** (0.07) 34 
    Satisfaction 18 0.45*** (0.07) 0.70*** (0.09) 13 
    Satisfaction 19 0.44*** (0.08) 0.52*** (0.07) 12 
    Very Satisfied 20 0.43*** (0.10) 0.64*** (0.11) 4 
Linearized standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Predictive probability of co-production under the condition of citizen 
satisfaction with 95% confidence intervals 
  
Adjusted Wald tests were conducted to evaluate whether there were differences 
across the margins and reported in Table 4-4. For Model 1, the estimated margins 
between dissatisfied and satisfied people are significantly different for both unconditional 
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mean and conditional mean estimates (F(1, 11) = 44.23; p-value < 0.0001). Similar trends 
are shown in both the total-sample estimation and the subpopulation condition. In the 
total sample condition, the estimated probability of co-production for satisfied citizens is 
0.46 which is significantly higher than 0.35 for dissatisfied citizens. Estimated margins 
for subpopulation conditions illustrate that the predicted probability of co-production for 
353 of satisfied citizens is 0.49, which is higher than that of probability for 195 of 
dissatisfied citizens, 0.30. 
For Model 2 with unconditional mean estimates, the probability of co-production 
increases as the levels of satisfaction increases until level 13 of satisfaction. The 
probability co-production increases from 0.21 at the level 5 of satisfaction to 0.43 at level 
13 of satisfaction. In Table 4-5, the probability increases at a decreasing rate until level 
13 of satisfaction. However, there are no significant changes after level 13 of satisfaction. 
In the Model 2 with conditional subpopulation mean estimates, the probability of co-
production at the extremes of satisfaction are turbulent since their sample sizes for each 
level of satisfaction are less than 15 observations. Thus, the statistical significances 
displayed in Table 4-4 needs to be considered with caution. Although the changes in the 
probability of co-production are not clear as the estimated probability with unconditional 
mean estimates, the probability of co-production increases from 0.12 at the level 8 of 
satisfaction to 0.61 at the level 16 of satisfaction. The trends of the predicted probabilities 
of co-production for unconditional and conditional means estimates are similar as in 
Figure 4-4. C and D. Overall, the estimated margins based on Model 2 suggest that the 
probability of co-production increases as satisfaction increases at a decreasing rate and 
there is no evidence of change at the extremely high satisfaction. 
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Table 4-4 Comparing the predicted probability of co-production at each citizen 
satisfaction level using adjusted Wald test 
Estimated probability 
of co-production 
Unconditional means Conditional means 
Former 
(1) 
Latter 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
Former 
(1) 
Latter 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
Model 1: Dissatisfied 
Satisfied vs. 
dissatisfied 0.46 0.35 -0.11*** 0.49 0.30 -0.19*** 
 
Model 2: Quadratic 
Satisfaction 5 and 6 0.21 0.24 0.03*** 0.14 0.32 0.18** 
Satisfaction 6 and 7 0.24 0.28 0.04*** 0.32 0.20 -0.12 
Satisfaction 7 and 8 0.28 0.31 0.03*** 0.20 0.12 -0.08** 
Satisfaction 8 and 9 0.31 0.34 0.03*** 0.12 0.21 0.09** 
Satisfaction 9 and 10 0.34 0.37 0.03*** 0.21 0.33 0.12 
Satisfaction 10 and 11 0.37 0.40 0.03*** 0.33 0.36 0.03* 
Satisfaction 11 and 12 0.40 0.42 0.02** 0.36 0.40 0.04* 
Satisfaction 12 and 13 0.42 0.43 0.01* 0.40 0.42 0.02 
Satisfaction 13 and 14 0.43 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.42 0.00 
Satisfaction 14 and 15 0.45 0.45 0.00 0.42 0.48 0.06 
Satisfaction 15 and 16 0.45 0.46 0.01 0.48 0.61 0.13*** 
Satisfaction 16 and 17 0.46 0.46 0.00 0.61 0.55 -0.06 
Satisfaction 17 and 18 0.46 0.45 -0.01 0.55 0.70 0.15*** 
Satisfaction 18 and 19 0.45 0.44 -0.01 0.70 0.52 -0.18* 
Satisfaction 19 and 20 0.44 0.43 -0.01 0.52 0.64 0.12 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 One contribution of this essay is to apply descriptive and behavioral approaches 
when evaluating the relationship between citizen attitudes toward government 
performance and citizens’ collective behaviors and to provide a potential mechanism for 
such relationship. Based on a theoretical explanation from Oliver (1977, 1980) and 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), this paper suggests a more informative model 
considering the mechanisms of a non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction and 
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co-production at the individual level. The results suggest that citizens’ satisfaction with 
public services are non-linearly related to the co-producing behaviors. 
First of all, the results show the opposite direction to the first hypothesis. In 
detail, very satisfied and moderately satisfied people participated in co-production more 
than the people who are very dissatisfied and moderately dissatisfied with public 
services. Such tendency may occur when satisfied citizens fear that the service quality 
will become downgraded when they do not co-produce and, in turn, become dissatisfied. 
On the other hand, there could be an endowment effect among citizens who participate in 
co-production. In other words, citizens would value more of the public services that they 
invested their resources to co-produce which lead them to have ownership (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). Such effect may draw those citizens to be satisfied with the 
services.  People could also just co-produce when they are satisfied because they are 
positively disposed toward the government. 
The second hypothesis is partially supported. There is a negative quadratic 
relationship between citizen satisfaction and co-production, which is heavily driven by 
dissatisfied citizens. The probability of co-production increases as citizen satisfaction 
increases. However, after the critical point of satisfaction, there are no significant 
changes in the probability of co-production as satisfaction increases. Hence, the results 
suggest a non-linear relationship between co-production and satisfaction. Furthermore, 
these results indicate that descriptive and behavioral approaches should be combined to 
broaden our understanding of citizen co-production. 
The results of this essay are different from what Bovaird et al. (2015) found. 
There can be various reasons for different findings. One can be different administrative 
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cultures and different samples. While Bovaird and his colleagues collected samples from 
five European countries that have parliamentary administrative cultures, the data used in 
this study is collected in the US that has a constitution-based federal republic 
administrative culture. Thus, the US citizens and European citizens may have different 
perspectives on government performance and public services. Another possible reason is 
different features of co-production. Bovaird and his colleagues studied co-production 
related to safety, health, and protecting the environment at the individual and collective 
levels. The current study measured co-production by whether people attend municipal 
and parents’ association meetings, which are more abstract. Thus, collecting data from 
various cultures, administrative systems, and public services is important to further 
extend the understanding of the relationship between citizen attitudes and co-producing 
behavior. 
  However, the current data are not sufficient to directly test such mechanisms of 
the proposed model, since the data do not include expectations and perceived 
performance of public services. To fully evaluate the proposed model, citizen 
expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction should align with a public service. 
For instance, citizen expectations, performance evaluations, and satisfaction with the 
performance of the police in the neighborhood will be more closely related to 
individuals’ joining a group, such as Neighbor Watch, rather than citizen co-production 
in other urban services such as recycling. 
Furthermore, this essay cannot conclude a causal relationship between citizen 
satisfaction with public services and co-production since a cross-section data is used in 
this paper. However, studying the causal relationship is important, especially when one 
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wants to encourage citizen co-production. The ideal is to collect panel data that measures 
citizen expectations for public services for the following year, the perceived quality of 
public services and satisfaction with those, and co-producing behaviors. This will allow 
scholars to study citizen co-production as a consequence of previous satisfaction with 
public services. Another approach is conducting experiments. By manipulating citizen 
satisfaction through randomly priming individuals to have high or low expectations and 
perceived performance, scholars can understand how perceived performance is connected 
to co-production behaviors through satisfaction. The two-by-two experimental design 
where participants are primed to have either high or low expectations and either high or 
low perceived performance would be appropriate. The random assignment can minimize 
the bias from multicollinearity between expectations and perceived performance on 
satisfaction. When individuals’ intention and participation in co-production are measured 
after assessing satisfaction, the issues of endogeneity could be minimized.  
For future studies, it will be beneficial to consider citizen co-production based on 
the spectrum of public-private goods, depending on the level of rivalry or excludability of 
a public service as suggested by public economics. For instance, is a person who cannot 
escape from a negative externality, such as air pollution, is more likely to join 
environmental groups and try to recycle, to use public transportation, and to prioritize the 
government budget to improve environmental conditions? Who are the people that co-
produce or not? Based on these research questions, we can understand the conditions and 
features of public services that lead citizens and government officials to have different 
patterns of co-production. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
 
 The three independent essays in this dissertation used psychological and 
behavioral concepts to further understand citizen attitudes toward government 
performance and collaborative behaviors in the public sector. The research examined how 
cognitive mechanisms play a role in citizen understanding of government performance, in 
forming citizen attitudes toward government, and in making decisions to participate in 
co-production of public services. More specifically, construal level theory was used to 
test how abstract and detailed thinking, together with the fit between type of thinking and 
the content of information about government performance, would explain attitudes 
toward government performance. Also, prospect theory and expectancy-disconfirmation 
ideas were used to examine the cognitive mechanisms explaining why citizens decide to 
co-produce in providing public services.  
 The first essay examined whether abstract or detailed mental construal would 
influence the relationship between citizen expectations of government performance and 
attitudes toward a government. Furthermore, it examined whether citizen attitudes toward 
a government would be affected by the fit between cognitive mechanisms and the content 
of information about why and how a government provided public services. When 
cognitive mechanisms and the information contents about government performance fitted 
well together, individuals would tend to feel right and attributed that feeling to the good 
government performance. Based on construal level theory, the types of expectations 
related to government performance and the information contents about why or how a 
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government provided public services could share similar features. The theory, suggesting 
that normative expectations of government performance and information about why a 
government provided public services would focus on the desirability of public services, 
would lead individuals to hold abstract thinking. On the other hand, the theory suggesting 
empirical expectations of government performance and information about how a 
government provided public services would focus on the feasibility of public services 
would lead individuals to hold detailed thinking. Thus, it is anticipated that participants in 
the matched cases (i.e., having normative expectations and reading a why-message; 
having empirical expectations and reading a how-message) would form more positive 
attitudes toward a government than those in the mismatched cases (i.e., having normative 
expectations and reading a how-message; having empirical expectations and reading a 
why-message).  
As hypothesized, participants primed to hold normative expectations of 
government performance tended to think in more abstract-terms than those primed to 
hold empirical expectations of government performance. Also, the more participants felt 
distant from their local government and thought in abstract terms, the less they favored 
their hometown local government. The message content significantly moderated the 
relationship between cognitive mechanisms and participants’ attitudes. Participants who 
read the ‘why’ message were more responsive to the level of abstract thinking compared 
to those who read the ‘how’ message. However, the results showed the opposite results 
from what was hypothesized. For example, ones who were in an abstract-thinking mode 
and exposed to the ‘why’ message tended to show more negative attitudes toward 
governments compared to those who exposed to the ‘how’ message. Nevertheless, the 
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results indicate that people holding normative or empirical expectations went through 
distinct thinking processes, leading individuals to form different attitudes toward 
governments. 
 The second essay (Chapter 3) tested the differences between abstract thinkers and 
detailed thinkers on how citizens would judge satisfaction with government performance. 
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the two vignettes using to manipulate 
individuals to be in abstract or detailed thinking mode. After the manipulation, 
participants’ expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction related to government 
performance were measured. Although the manipulation did not successfully shift 
individuals’ way of thinking, the treatment and the level of abstract thinking moderated 
the relationships between expectations and satisfaction related to government 
performance. For example, participants who were primed to think in abstract terms 
tended to have larger effects of expectations of government performance on satisfaction 
with public services, compared to those who were primed to think in detailed terms. 
There were no effects of the treatment and the level of abstract thinking on the 
relationship between disconfirmation (the differences between expectations and 
perceived performance) and satisfaction with government performance. Although it 
seems that people carrying distinct cognitive mechanisms tended to differently shape 
expectations and judge satisfaction related to government performance, the results were 
inconclusive.  
 In Chapter 4, the essay assessed the relationship between citizen satisfaction with 
government performance and co-production in the provision of public services with a 
new model that incorporated prospect theory and the expectancy-disconfirmation model. 
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The new model predicted a nonlinear relationship between the two. Since the prospect 
theory framework proposed negativity bias and S-curve value function, it was expected 
that citizens who were dissatisfied with public services would be disproportionately more 
likely to co-produce. Also, a negative quadratic relationship between satisfaction and co-
production was anaticipated. Unlike initial hypothesis, neutral and satisfied citizens were 
disproportionately more likely to co-produce than dissatisfied citizens. Also, there was a 
negative quadratic relationship, which was heavily driven by dissatisfied citizens. In 
general, the probability for citizens to participate in the meetings to co-produce 
significantly increased until a certain level of satisfaction with government performance 
(16.4 in the range of 5, very dissatisfied, to 20, very satisfied). After this level, the 
probability for citizen co-production did not significantly change. 
Implications 
 This dissertation provides evidence for the role of the mental mechanisms 
underlying citizen attitudes toward government performance and collaborative behavior 
in the public sector by using psychological concepts and methods. The essays in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3 used construal level theory to test how individuals’ thinking in abstract 
or detailed terms was associated with their reactions to government performance and their 
attitudes toward governments. The results offered only partial evidence supporting these 
particular mechanisms, yet also suggest the value of testing these ideas further. Such 
research, especially if it addresses some of the limitations of the current essays, may 
indeed show that types of construal play a significant role in citizen perceptions and 
evaluations of government performance. 
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In addition, this dissertation could bridge with other disciplines that have also 
examined cognitive mechanisms by applying psychological concepts and methods. For 
instance, scholars studying public administration can learn from the studies of 
communication strategies and consumer behaviors that applied the concept of 
psychological distance. Also, researchers could evaluate how government officials make 
decisions under uncertain situations by learning from other studies using prospect theory. 
Through the multi-disciplinary approaches of studying behavioral public administration, 
scholars could advance and develop theories and methods of both psychology and public 
administration (Olsen, 2015). 
 To study the causal mechanisms of how individuals form attitudes and 
satisfaction, this dissertation used experiments that allowed for randomly assigned 
participants into groups with exogenous treatments. Many public administration studies 
using cross-sectional and survey data face the issues of internal validity, such as 
potentials misidentifying the causal relationships. For instance, many cross-sectional 
survey studies of factors related to citizen satisfaction are unable to rule out the 
possibility that satisfaction may also influence these factors through a reverse causation 
process. However, the experiment conducted in the first essay, because the hypothesized 
variables were manipulated, provided a means of concluding with a degree of confidence 
what caused the effects. Citizen attitudes toward governments were indeed likely to be 
caused by the manipulation of type of expectations and of type of information related to 
government performance. By studying causal mechanisms of citizen perception of 
government performance, the results from the experiments in the essays could contribute 
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to improving the prediction of citizen attitudes by understanding the moderators and 
mediators of the relationships between citizen attitudes and civic behaviors. 
Another contribution of this dissertation is combining prospect theory and the 
expectancy-disconfirmation ideas to test a novel claim about the relationship between 
citizen satisfaction with government performance and citizen participation in public 
service production. This enabled a test of a negative quadratic connection between citizen 
satisfaction with public services and co-production. This approach, as it shifts thinking 
from a linear to a non-linear one, could help scholars become aware of the especially 
complex nature of how these variables relate to each other. Guided by this approach, 
future studies could further refine the theories and methods to evaluate citizen satisfaction 
and co-production, enhancing, for example, predictions related to who gets involved in 
public service and how this involvement comes about, narrowing the gap between the 
theory and the practice. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
 Although numerous psychological theories could be used to study the relationship 
between citizen expectations of public services and citizen attitudes toward government 
performance, in this dissertation only a subset of the possible approaches was used (e.g., 
only comparing normative and empirical expectations) and only a single theory was used 
as a main guide, construal level theory. However, expectations are very complex in 
nature. For instance, not only can expectations take other basic forms (Jacobsen, Snyder, 
Saultz 2015), but individuals can hold both normative and empirical expectations at the 
same time. Future studies should consider expectations that are both normative and 
empirical, as well as expectations that take other forms, in order to achieve a more 
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complete understanding of role of citizen expectations in attitudes formation toward 
government performance. 
It should be emphasized that this dissertation not only represents a novel 
application of construal level theory to citizen attitudes toward government performance, 
but it is also one of the few studies taking a psychological approach to this and related 
topics. Hence, future studies are encouraged to apply diverse psychological theories such 
as elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Such alternative theories, for 
instance, could study the effect of information related to government performance on 
citizen attitudes toward the performance. Theories could identify factors (e.g., individual 
motivations to participate in co-production) that lead individuals to think carefully and 
change citizen attitudes or opinions related to government performance.  
 Furthermore, future studies should integrate other potentially important factors 
into a fuller picture of the complex process likely to be involved. The factors to be 
considered, for instance, include citizens’ emotional valence toward government 
performance, self-efficacy in the public sector (e.g., political efficacy), and individuals’ 
belief in the effects of their action. To understand citizen satisfaction and co-production 
behavior more comprehensively, it is important to include other variables, consider 
theories related to cognitive processes, and test the causal mechanisms among factors. 
 Future studies should replicate the present findings using different primes, varied 
public services, and more representative populations. For instance, university students 
may differ from the general population since they have had fewer experiences with public 
services. Thus, university students might not be aware of themselves as active and 
engaged consumers of public services. Future studies could use a larger sample from the 
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general population through Mechanical Turk and Time-sharing Experiments for the 
Social Sciences. 
 Although various public services were included in this dissertation, future studies 
should consider the features of public service that might create different civic behaviors. 
For example, studies could apply the concept of public goods from economics. The two 
main features of public goods are non-excludability and non-rivalry. Non-excludability is 
a concept that explains the difficulty to exclude individuals from using the good once it is 
provided. For example, citizens could be excluded from medical services when they are 
not qualified or are not paying for the services; whereas citizens cannot be excluded from 
the policies related to national defense. Non-rivalry means that citizens can consume 
public resources without competing against each other in terms of use. For instance, 
using national parks has a very low rivalry since many people can use the park at the 
same time. A public parking space has a high rivalry since another person cannot use the 
space once a car is parked. Considering the degree of publicness in goods and services is 
essential because it is closely related to the market for public goods. Moreover, the 
markets set up the environments for civic behaviors, such as exiting the market or not. 
Thus, future studies need to include the features of public goods and evaluate the 
interactions among individuals’ psychological factors and their environments.
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A A 1 Survey items for Chapter 2 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
Familiarity How familiar are you with the (traffic signal system; road conditions; 
sidewalk conditions) provided by your hometown local government 
mentioned in this survey? 
 
Not familiar 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
familiar 
7 
 
Manipulation 
Normative 
Expectations 
What would you expect from public services provided by your 
hometown local government? 
 
Services: Overall performance of the local government; traffic signal 
system; road conditions; sidewalk conditions 
 
− Should be excellent all the time 
− Should be excellent most of the time 
− Should be excellent some of the time 
− Should rarely be excellent 
− Should never be excellent 
 
Empirical 
Expectations 
What would you expect from public services provided by your 
hometown local government? 
 
Services: Overall performance of the local government; traffic signal 
system; road conditions; sidewalk conditions 
 
− Will be excellent all the time 
− Will be excellent most of the time 
− Will be excellent some of the time 
− Will rarely be excellent 
− Will never be excellent 
 
Manipulation Check 
Closeness How closely connected do you feel to your hometown local 
government? 
 
Not 
connected 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
closely 
connected 
7 
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Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued) 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
Likelihood How likely or unlikely do you think your hometown local 
government will meet your expectations for its services? 
 
Very 
unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
likely 
7 
 
 
Time When do you think your hometown local government will meet your 
expectations for services? 
 
Very 
soon 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very far 
in the 
future 
7 
 
 
Message orientation 
‘Why’ 
message 
Why Does Your Hometown Local Government Provide Public 
Services? 
  
In accordance with the state constitution, cities enjoy home rule to 
promote public purposes. As part of these, your hometown local 
government provides the following public services: traffic signals, 
road cleaning, and sidewalk maintenance. 
  
i. Why your hometown local government controls the traffic signal 
system: 
The aim of controlling traffic lights is to have smooth and safe traffic. 
Successful management of the traffic signal system brings less 
congestion and accidents. 
  
ii. Why your hometown local government cleans streets: 
The goal of cleaning streets is a) to minimize chemicals and dust from 
cars and b) to increase the efficiency of storm drains and prevent 
clogs. 
  
iii. Why your hometown local government maintains sidewalks: 
The purpose of sidewalk management is to ensure safe travel for 
everybody, especially for children and people with disabilities and to 
increase access to various places such as schools, parks, public 
transportation, etc. 
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Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued) 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
‘How’ 
message 
How Does Your Hometown Local Government Provide Public 
Services? 
  
Your hometown local government serves the population with diverse 
public services, depending on social and economic situations.  To 
meet the public needs, your hometown local government provides the 
following public services: traffic signals, road cleaning, and sidewalk 
maintenance. 
  
i. How your hometown local government controls the traffic signal 
system: 
Your hometown local government uses an automatic control system 
that calculates the traffic flow and adjusts the time intervals of traffic 
signals creating smooth traffic. 
  
ii. How your hometown local government cleans streets: 
Once a month, your hometown local government asks residents in 
each district to park elsewhere and sweeps and washes the streets in 
the district. This activity operates at the time when there is the least 
traffic of the day. 
  
iii. How your hometown local government maintains sidewalks: 
Your hometown local government regularly inspects and citizens 
report the condition of sidewalks, whether sidewalks are collapsed, 
has an unbalanced surface, etc. After the troubles are identified, your 
hometown local government paves the damaged sidewalks with 
cement or replaces defective curbs. 
Citizen Attitudes 
Confidence How confident or not confident are you in your hometown local 
government providing public services? 
 
Not 
confident 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
confident 
7 
 
 
Feeling How positive or negative do you feel toward your hometown local 
government in providing public services? 
 
Not 
confident 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
confident 
7 
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Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued) 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
Importance How important do you think your hometown local government is for 
providing public services? 
 
Not 
confident 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
confident 
7 
 
 
Trust in 
Government 
To what extent do you trust your hometown local government? 
 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A lot 
7 
 
 
Attention 
Check 
Dillon's Rule states that local governments are creatures of their state 
government. But the real purpose of this question is to check whether 
you're paying attention. Ignore your answers to the other questions. 
This is not related to the survey. This question is to check your 
attention. Only press three on the seven-point scale. 
 
Scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Scale 
7 
 
 
Controls 
Age What is your age?    ____________________ 
 Decline to answer. 
 
Gender What is your gender? 
_____ Male 
_____ Female 
_____ Decline to answer. 
 
Ideology In general, would you describe your political views as 
Very liberal 
1 2 3 4 
Very 
conservative 
5 
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Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued) 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
Ethnic 
Background 
Which of the following describes your race? White, Black or African 
American, Asian or Asian American or some other race. 
 
− White (e.g., Caucasian, European, Irish, Italian, Arab, Middle 
Eastern) 
− Black or African-American (e.g., Negro, Kenyan, Nigerian, 
Haitian) 
− Asian or Asian-American (e.g., Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, 
Vietnamese or other Asian origin groups) 
− Native American/American Indian/Alaska Native 
− Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian 
− Hispanic/Latino (e.g., Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban) 
− Some other race (please specify) 
− Don't know 
− Decline to answer. 
Perceived 
Performance 
Before you took this survey, how would you rate the overall quality 
of the public services, that goes beyond those services related to traffic 
lights, streets, and sidewalks provided by your hometown local 
government (those including traffic, roads, and sidewalks and 
beyond)? 
 
Very 
poor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Excellent 
7   
Satisfaction Before you took this survey, how satisfied are you with the 
performance of hometown local government’s overall services, that 
goes beyond those related services to traffic lights, streets, and 
sidewalks (those including traffic, roads, and sidewalks and beyond)? 
 
Very 
dissatisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
satisfied 
7 
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APPENDIX B 
Table A B 1 Survey items for Chapter 3 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
Trust in 
Government 
To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government? 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A lot 
7         
Familiarity How familiar are you with the (traffic signal system; road 
conditions; sidewalk conditions) provided by your hometown local 
government mentioned in this survey? 
Not 
familiar 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
familiar 
7         
Manipulation 
‘Now’  
Low construal 
condition 
(Psychologically 
near condition) 
CallGov Is Here for You Now! 
 
Your hometown local government is trying to find a way to 
effectively correct everyday problems in delivering services, such as 
garbage pickups, and improve the community. 
  
You Can Use It Now 
Your hometown local government recently launched a website and 
a mobile app, “CallGov.” Through CallGov, individuals now have 
easier access to their government. There are some defects that are 
difficult for your local government to efficiently identify, such as 
potholes in the streets, inefficient traffic light systems, and cracks in 
the sidewalks. When residents submit defects that the government 
cannot effectively detect, your hometown local government will 
respond to the information, correct the fault, and improve the 
quality of public services. Through this project, your hometown 
local government and residents can collaborate to make a safer and 
cleaner community. 
  
Your hometown local government is now collecting feedback from 
the users and promoting the program to citizens for its wide usage. 
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Table A B 1 Survey Items for Chapter 3 (continued) 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
‘Next year’ 
High construal 
condition 
(Psychologically 
distant 
condition) 
The New Program, CallGov, Will Come Later Next Year 
 
The local government is trying to find a way to serve citizens 
better, for example, in garbage pickups and cleaning streets, and 
improve the community. 
 
It’s Coming Next Year 
Next year, your local government is planning to launch a 
website and a mobile app, “CallGov.” The goal of CallGov is to 
help individuals have easier access to their local government. 
There are some problems that are difficult for your local 
government to efficiently identify, such as potholes in the 
streets, inefficient traffic light systems, and cracks in the 
sidewalks. When residents report these problem, the local 
government will respond to the information, correct the fault, 
and improve the quality of public services. Through this project, 
the local government and residents can collaborate to create a 
safer and cleaner community. 
 
In order to launch this program sometime next year, the local 
government is now collecting related information and securing 
revenue for the project. 
 
Manipulation Check 
Time When do you think this program, ‘CallGov,’ will be launched and 
implemented in your hometown local community? 
 
Never 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
soon 
7 
 
Likely to 
Download 
How likely or unlikely would you be to download and use 
‘CallGov?’ 
Very 
unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
likely 
7 
 
Likely to use How many out of 10 defects will you report through “CallGov?” 
None 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Every 
time 
10 
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Table A B 1 Survey Items for Chapter 3 (continued) 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
Expectations How would you rate your expectations for the (overall quality of the 
public services; effectiveness of traffic signal system; condition of 
road maintenance; condition of sidewalk maintenance) which (are/is) 
managed by your hometown local government? 
Very low 
expectations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very high 
expectations 
7         
Perceived 
performance 
How would you rate the (overall quality of the public services; 
effectiveness of traffic signal system; condition of road maintenance; 
condition of sidewalk maintenance) provided by your hometown local 
government? 
Poor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Excellent 
7 
 
Satisfaction How satisfied are you with the performance of your hometown local 
government’s (overall services; management of traffic signal systems; 
management of road maintenance; management of sidewalk 
maintenance)? 
Very 
dissatisfied 
1 2 3 
Neither 
satisfied 
nor 
dissatisfied 
4 5 6 
Very 
satisfied 
7 
 
 
Controls 
Age What is your age?    ____________________ 
 Decline to answer. 
Gender What is your gender? 
_____ Male 
_____ Female 
_____ Decline to answer. 
Ideology In general, would you describe your political views as 
Very liberal 
1 2 3 4 
Very 
conservative 
5 
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Table A B 1 Survey Items for Chapter 3 (continued) 
Variables Questions and Likert-scales 
Ethnic 
Background 
Which of the following describes your race? White, Black or African 
American, Asian or Asian American or some other race. 
 
_____   White (e.g., Caucasian, European, Irish, Italian, Arab,  
             Middle Eastern) 
_____   Black or African-American (e.g., Negro, Kenyan,  
             Nigerian, Haitian) 
_____   Asian or Asian-American (e.g., Asian Indian, Chinese, 
Filipino, Vietnamese or other Asian origin groups) 
_____   Native American/American Indian/Alaska Native 
_____   Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian 
_____   Hispanic/Latino (e.g., Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban) 
_____   Some other race (please specify) 
_____   Don't know. 
_____   Decline to answer. 
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APPENDIX C 
  
 
Table A C 1 Descriptive statistics for age, number of people in a household, and ideology 
Variables Mean Linearized S.E. Min Max 
Age 47.24 0.99 19 88 
No. of people in 
your household 2.85 0.08 1 10 
Ideology 6.12 0.25 1 10 
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Table A C 2 Proportions of the socio-economic variables 
Variables Proportion 
Gender  
   Female 0.56 
   Male  0.44 
Marital status  
   Single 0.22 
   In a relationship  0.59 
     Divorced or Separated 0.19 
Monthly income  
     Low: $2,720 or less 0.46 
     Middle: $2,721 - $5,325 0.29 
     High:  $5,326 or more 0.25 
Education  
     High school or less 0.42 
     College  0.50 
     Post graduate 0.08 
Work situation   
     Not in labor force 0.43 
     In labor force  0.57 
Partisanship   
     Republicans  0.18 
     Democrats  0.37 
     Independent  0.32 
     Other  0.13 
Religion   
    Catholic  0.28 
    Protestant 0.43 
    No religion 0.10 
    Others 0.20 
Race   
     White  0.68 
     Black  0.11 
     Hispanic  0.17 
    Others 0.05 
Region  
     West  0.23 
     Midwest  0.22 
     Northeast  0.15 
     South  0.40 
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Table A C 3 Descriptive statistics and questions related to key variables 
Variables Questions Mean Linearized SD Min Max 
Co-production  
  
  
 Never: 0 
Co-Produce: 1 when an individual at least attended a meeting 0.42 0.06 0 1 
Meetings of a community improvement committee or 
association 1.44 0.07 1 Never 
4 
Once a 
week 
Meetings of a parents’ association at school 1.43 0.08 1 4 
Citizen 
satisfaction 
  
  
  
  
 
 
Averaged  13.27 0.14 
5 
Very 
dissatisfied 
20 
Very 
satisfied 
In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, 
satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way 
democracy works in the United States? 
2.62 0.04 1 4 
In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or 
very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your 
neighborhood? 
2.94 0.04 1 4 
And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you 
very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied 
with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? 
2.49 0.06 1 4 
And the quality of public schools? Are you... 2.55 0.03 1 4 
And the quality of public medical and health services? Are 
you... 2.67 0.05 1 4 
Dissatisfaction  Dissatisfied: 1 if average satisfaction < 12.5 
Not dissatisfied: 0 if average satisfaction  12.49   0.35 0.01 0 1 
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Table A C 3 Descriptive statistics and questions related to key variables (continued) 
Variables Questions Mean Linearized SD Min Max 
Trust in 
political 
institutions  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Averaged 3.65 0.14 1 Not at all 
7 
A lot 
To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are 
well protected by the political system of the United States?  3.63 0.09 1 7 
To what extent do you respect the political institutions of the 
United States?   3.59 0.18 1 7 
To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political 
system of the United States?  4.19 0.14 1 7 
To what extent do you think that one should support the 
political system of the United States?  4.63 0.14 1 7 
To what extent do you trust political parties?  2.88 0.15 1 7 
To what extent do you trust the President?  2.95 0.15 1 7 
Approval for 
President 
Speaking in general of the current administration, how would 
you rate the job performance of President Barack Obama? 3.22 0.09 
1 
Very bad 
5 
Very good 
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Table A C 4 Factor loadings based on a principal components analysis with orthogonal 
rotation for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political institutions 
Questions Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Co-production  
Meetings of a community improvement committee 
or association 0.80  
- - 
Meetings of a parents’ association at school 0.78  - - 
Meetings of any religious organization 0.65  - - 
 
Citizen satisfaction 
In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, 
satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the 
way democracy works in the United States? 
0.57 - - 
In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, 
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the 
performance of the police in your neighborhood? 
0.68 - - 
And thinking about this city/area where you live, are 
you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very 
dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, 
and highways? 
0.70 - - 
And the quality of public schools? Are you... 0.75 - - 
And the quality of public medical and health 
services? Are you... 0.69 - - 
 
Trust in political institutions 
To what extent do you think the courts in the United 
States guarantee a fair trial?  0.35 0.64 0.09 
To what extent do you respect the political 
institutions of the United States?   0.79 0.11 0.31 
To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic 
rights are well protected by the political system of 
the United States?  
0.70 0.27 0.30 
To what extent do you feel proud of living under the 
political system of the United States?  0.75 0.37 0.08 
To what extent do you think that one should support 
the political system of the United States?  0.65 0.43 0.03 
To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?  0.19 0.73 -0.15 
To what extent do you trust the justice system?  0.51 0.62 0.26 
To what extent do you trust the U.S. Congress? 0.68 0.18 0.27 
To what extent do you trust the Police?  0.17 0.81 0.11 
To what extent do you trust political parties?  0.61 0.16 0.48 
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Table A C 4 Factor loadings based on a principal components analysis with orthogonal 
rotation for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and Trust in political institutions 
(continued) 
Questions Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Trust in political institutions  
To what extent do you trust the President?  0.19 -0.06 0.81 
To what extent do you trust the local or municipal 
government?  0.20 0.65 0.43 
To what extent do you trust the mass media?  0.23 0.18 0.77 
To what extent do you trust elections in this country?  0.37 0.41 0.53 
Bolded numbers are the items that are highly loading for a certain factor but not for 
other factors. 
 
 
The analysis used principal component factor analysis with orthogonal rotation 
for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political institution to create indices for 
those variables. Table A 4 in Appendix provides the loading factors for individual items 
related to co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political institutions. 
Initially, three items measured co-production: attending municipal meetings to 
improve the community, parents’ association, and religious meetings. Although all three 
items are loaded in one factor with the variance of 1.67 in principal component factor 
analysis, Cronbach’s alpha measures suggest people who attend religious meetings are 
different from people who attend or do not attend other meetings. When I drop the item 
that measures individuals’ attendance in religious meetings, Cronbach’s alpha increases 
from 0.53 to 0.61, which meets the recommended value of 0.6 for exploratory studies in 
social sciences (Hair et al., 2006; Hinton et al., 2004). The response is the frequency of 
attending a meeting: 1, never, 2, once or twice a year, 3, once or twice a month, and 4, 
one a week. However, merely creating an index by adding the ratings is not accurate. In 
other words, the same ratings may not correctly reflect levels of individuals’ co-
production. For example, Person A and Person B have 4 in the level of attendance. 
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Person A never attends municipal meetings (rating 1) but attend parents’ association once 
or twice a month (rating 3); while Person B attends both meetings once or twice a year 
(both are rating 2). In this example, it is difficult to say that the level of co-production by 
Person A and Person B is the same. 
The main explanatory variable, citizen satisfaction, is averaged across five areas: 
the democratic system in the U.S., police performance, conditions of roads, public school 
services, and public health services. Cronbach’s alpha for these five items is 0.713. The 
results from principal component factor analysis suggest that all five items are loaded in a 
factor with the variance of 2.32, which explains 46.32% of total variance. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the 14 items measuring trust in political institutions is 0.90 
suggesting very high internal consistency among the items. However, principal 
component factor analysis with orthogonal rotation suggests multiple factors. In this 
article, two dimensions are selected since they show the most straightforward loaded 
factors with Eigenvalues exceeding 1.0. However, I loaded the third factor, with 
Eigenvalue of 0.90, to have a clearer view of the loading factors in Factor 1 and Factor 2. 
Factor 1 with the variance of 3.64 (26.01% of total variance) seems to show how much 
people trust, have confidence, and support political systems and institutions. Factor 2 
with 3.07 (21.93% of total variance) illustrates how much people trust and have 
confidence in regulatory institutions such as judicial, armed force and police. Both factors 
are highly correlated (correlation coefficient is 0.62). The model includes the former 
factor to focus on trust in political institutions related to social and community aspects, 
not regulatory agents. Cronbach’s alpha for the six items loaded in the former factor is 
0.87.
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Table A C 4 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions 
 
Variables 
Trust Approval of 
President 
Age People in 
Household 
Gender Relationship Status 
Male Female Single In Separate 
Unconditional for subpopulation 
   Model 1 & 2 3.65 3.22 47.24 2.85 0.44 0.56 0.22 0.59 0.19 
 
Conditional for subpopulation 
Satisfied 4.06 3.09 49.04 2.80 0.47 0.53 0.22 0.59 0.19 
Dissatisfied 2.87 3.47 43.89 2.94 0.39 0.61 0.24 0.59 0.59 
Satisfaction 5 1.33 3.47 41.61 1.90 0.43 0.57 0.60 0.40 - 
Satisfaction 6 1.26 3.06 43.01 3.26 0.25 0.75 - - 3 
Satisfaction 7 2.36 3.66 38.73 2.41 0.47 0.53 0.51 0.41 0.08 
Satisfaction 8 1.94 3.17 35.97 2.56 0.55 0.45 0.58 0.42 - 
Satisfaction 9 3.16 3.53 41.09 2.73 0.71 0.29 0.44 0.48 0.09 
Satisfaction 10 3.00 3.07 45.94 2.90 0.43 0.57 0.22 0.55 0.23 
Satisfaction 11 2.69 3.70 33.39 3.03 0.20 0.80 0.16 0.65 0.20 
Satisfaction 12 3.14 3.57 45.4 3.13 0.36 0.64 0.14 0.70 0.16 
Satisfaction 13 3.44 3.13 45.10 3.03 0.48 0.52 0.28 0.56 0.16 
Satisfaction 14 3.75 3.80 52.97 2.49 0.49 0.51 0.12 0.56 0.33 
Satisfaction 15 4.09 2.87 50.07 2.43 0.53 0.47 0.26 0.57 0.18 
Satisfaction 16 4.71 3.10 47.54 3.21 0.28 0.72 0.16 0.70 0.14 
Satisfaction 17 4.96 2.57 49.42 3.32 0.53 0.47 0.26 0.62 0.11 
Satisfaction 18 5.37 2.00 49.69 3.58 0.34 0.66 0.11 0.83 0.06 
Satisfaction 19 4.85 2.53 49.16 2.38 0.31 0.69 0.20 0.58 0.22 
Satisfaction 20 5.48 2.05 35.31 3.12 0.27 0.73 0.45 0.29 0.26 
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Table A C 5 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions (continued) 
Variables Monthly Income Education Level Labor Force Ideology Low Middle High HS/less College Post Grad Out In 
Unconditional to subpopulation      
Model 1 & 2 0.46 0.29 0.25 0.42 0.50 0.08 0.43 0.57 6.12 
 
Conditional to subpopulation 
Satisfied 0.41 0.30 0.29 0.44 0.47 0.09 0.44 0.56 6.36 
Dissatisfied 0.54 0.27 0.18 0.38 0.55 0.07 0.40 0.60 5.68 
Satisfaction 5 0.60 0.40 - 0.60 0.40 - 0.43 0.057 7.37 
Satisfaction 6 0.25 0.27 0.48 - 2 - 0.25 0.75 8.47 
Satisfaction 7 0.69 0.08 0.24 0.53 0.39 0.08 0.32 0.68 5.52 
Satisfaction 8 0.85 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.85 - 0.29 0.71 3.33 
Satisfaction 9 0.80 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.66 0.16 0.27 0.73 6.09 
Satisfaction 10 0.49 0.33 0.18 0.51 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.60 4.66 
Satisfaction 11 0.50 0.35 0.15 0.43 0.54 0.03 0.59 0.41 5.69 
Satisfaction 12 0.45 0.31 0.24 0.37 0.56 0.07 0.34 0.66 6.35 
Satisfaction 13 0.41 0.32 0.26 0.36 0.58 0.07 0.46 0.54 6.30 
Satisfaction 14 0.43 0.34 0.23 0.50 0.44 0.06 0.50 0.50 6.33 
Satisfaction 15 0.42 0.25 0.33 0.41 0.51 0.08 0.37 0.63 6.51 
Satisfaction 16 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.59 0.33 0.08 0.42 0.58 7.12 
Satisfaction 17 0.29 0.44 0.27 0.56 0.36 0.08 0.53 0.47 5.64 
Satisfaction 18 0.47 0.19 0.34 0.38 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.71 5.79 
Satisfaction 19 0.35 0.42 0.23 0.36 0.42 0.21 0.76 0.24 6.11 
Satisfaction 20 0.45 0.26 0.29 0.56 0.26 0.18 - 1 7.52 
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Table A C 5 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions (continued) 
Variables Partisanship Religion Ethnicity Others Republican Democrats Independence Catholic Protestant None Others White 
Unconditional to subpopulation       
Model 1 & 2 0.13 0.18 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.43 0.10 0.20 0.68 
 
Conditional for subpopulation 
Satisfied 0.12 0.21 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.46 0.08 0.18 0.67 
Dissatisfied 0.13 0.14 0.36 0.36 0.24 0.38 0.14 0.23 0.70 
Satisfaction 5 - - 0.17 0.83 - 0.40 0.43 0.17 0.83 
Satisfaction 6 0.48 - - 0.52 0.27 - 0.25 0.48 0.52 
Satisfaction 7 0.30 0.10 0.36 0.23 0.15 0.35 0.37 0.12 0.59 
Satisfaction 8 0.44 0.07 0.24 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.81 
Satisfaction 9 0.05 0.11 0.67 0.16 0.58 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.90 
Satisfaction 10 0.18 0.04 0.38 0.39 0.08 0.43 0.17 0.32 0.60 
Satisfaction 11 0.12 0.26 0.22 0.41 0.13 0.49 0.10 0.28 0.64 
Satisfaction 12 0.06 0.15 0.38 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.07 0.19 0.75 
Satisfaction 13 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.44 0.08 0.20 0.72 
Satisfaction 14 0.06 0.24 0.29 0.41 0.22 0.58 0.09 0.11 0.80 
Satisfaction 15 0.08 0.15 0.49 0.28 0.29 0.40 0.08 0.24 0.65 
Satisfaction 16 0.03 0.23 0.40 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.01 0.04 0.49 
Satisfaction 17 0.20 0.24 0.36 0.20 0.22 0.43 0.08 0.26 0.57 
Satisfaction 18 0.30 0.27 0.34 0.09 0.46 0.39 - 0.15 0.51 
Satisfaction 19 - 0.15 0.49 0.36 0.28 0.44 0.21 0.07 0.58 
Satisfaction 20 0.18 0.53 0.29 - 0.27 0.47 - 0.26 0.44 
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Table A C 5 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions (continued) 
Variables Ethnicity Areas Black Hispanic Others West Midwest Northeast South 
Unconditional for subpopulation      
     Model 1 & 2 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.40 
 
Conditional for subpopulation 
Satisfied 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.24 0.22 0.14 0.40 
Dissatisfied 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.39 
Satisfaction 5 0.17 - - 0.57 - - 0.43 
Satisfaction 6 - - 0.48 0.27 0.48 - 0.25 
Satisfaction 7 0.41 - - 0.20 - 0.56 0.23 
Satisfaction 8 0.15 0.04 - 0.12 0.51 0.17 0.19 
Satisfaction 9 0.08 - 0.02 0.08 0.45 0.27 0.20 
Satisfaction 10 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.26 0.20 0.10 0.44 
Satisfaction 11 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.38 0.09 0.07 0.46 
Satisfaction 12 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.44 
Satisfaction 13 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.37 
Satisfaction 14 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.41 0.16 0.14 0.28 
Satisfaction 15 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.42 
Satisfaction 16 0.11 0.38 0.02 0.26 0.17 0.15 0.43 
Satisfaction 17 0.26 0.17 - 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.58 
Satisfaction 18 0.05 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.19 0.66 
Satisfaction 19 0.20 0.21 - - 0.38 0.12 0.50 
Satisfaction 20 0.29 - 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.29 
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